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Formal constitutional amendment rules are the gatekeepers to 
the constitutional text.  They detail the procedures for changing the 
written constitution,1 specify what is subject to or immune from 
formal amendment,2 promote deliberation about constitutional 
meaning,3 distinguish the constitutional text from ordinary law,4 
and may also be designed to express constitutional values.5  Formal 
amendment rules are especially useful for channeling popular will 
into institutional dialogue6 and checking informal constitutional 
amendments.7  By their nature, formal amendment rules reflect 
both faith and distrust in political actors: they simultaneously 
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(Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012). 
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CHI. L. REV. 447, 471 (1991). 
 3. Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535, 571 (1995). 
 4. ANDRÁS SAJÓ, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 39–40 (1999). 
 5. Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment 
Rules, 59 MCGILL L.J. 225, 236 (2013). 
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the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 431 (1983). 
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Perspective, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96, 97 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). 
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authorize political actors to improve the constitution8 while limiting 
how and when political actors may do so.9  Given the many essential 
functions formal amendment rules serve, we would expect 
constitutions to entrench them, and indeed most of them do.10 
Yet the structure of formal amendment rules has received little 
scholarly attention.  Scholars have devoted considerably more 
attention to informal amendment,11 which we can define as “the 
alteration of constitutional meaning in the absence of textual 
change.”12  Though constitutions may today change less frequently 
via formal rather than informal amendment, constitutional 
designers must nonetheless understand the formal amendment 
options available to them in order to structure the formal 
amendment rules they entrench in the constitutions they design.  It 
is therefore surprising that constitutional designers have few 
academic resources to explain how to design the rules governing 
formal amendment, which John Burgess called in 1890 “the most 
important part of a constitution,”13 and which Akhil Amar has more 
recently described as holding “unsurpassed importance, for these 
rules define the conditions under which all other constitutional 
norms may be legally displaced.”14 
 
 8. Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional 
Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247, 275 (2002). 
 9. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An 
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 111, 123–24 (1993). 
 10. Bjørn Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and 
Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 319, 325 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006). 
 11. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 
(1991) (developing the theory of “constitutional moments”); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 383–420 (1998) (developing the same 
theory); JEREMY WEBBER, REIMAGINING CANADA: LANGUAGE, CULTURE, 
COMMUNITY, AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 260–305 (1994) (discussing 
informal amendment in Canada); Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: 
Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155, 180–209 (1997) 
(surveying theories of informal amendment); Rosalind Dixon, Partial 
Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 664–80 (2011) 
(developing the concept of “partial constitutional amendment”); Peter Oliver, 
Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 519, 526–
31 (1999); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1469–86 (2001).  See generally RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (compiling essays on constitutional change). 
 12. Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A 
Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 
929 (2007). 
 13. JOHN BURGESS, I POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 137 (1890). 
 14. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional 
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 461 (1994). 
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Scholars have developed criteria to classify formal amendment 
rules.  Their classifications help constitutional designers compare 
formal amendment rules across nations.  Yet these classifications 
are either over-inclusive, under-inclusive, or both.  As I will 
demonstrate, some classify formal amendment rules according only 
to voting thresholds, thereby failing to account for nonvoting criteria 
that often govern formal constitutional change.  Others classify 
formal amendment rules according to both voting thresholds and 
nonvoting criteria, but they fail to appreciate the larger structures 
around which formal amendment rules are built.  Still others 
classify constitutions whose textual democratic commitments serve 
only to cloak nondemocratic practices.  These classifications may be 
interesting, but they are largely unhelpful to democratic 
constitutional designers.  Although sham constitutions entrench 
formal amendment rules, their entrenched rules do not actually bind 
political actors, nor do citizens accept them as accurate and 
legitimate reflections of how power is actually exercised and 
constrained.15  Insofar as democratic constitutional design should 
reflect democratic practices in fact, formal amendment 
classifications are useful only where they exclude sham 
constitutions. 
In this Article, I construct a new classification of formal 
amendment rules based on my analysis of formal amendment rules 
in the world’s highest-performing democratic countries.  I identify 
the world’s leading democracies from the annual Democracy Index 
published by the Economist Intelligence Unit.16  The 2012 
Democracy Index “provides a snapshot of the state of democracy 
worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories—this 
 
 15. Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 853, 861–62 (1962). 
 16. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2012: 
DEMOCRACY AT A STANDSTILL (2013), available at http://www.eiu.com/public 
/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex12 (last visited Apr. 25, 
2014).  I have found the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index more 
informative and comprehensive than Freedom House’s own index, which, 
though perhaps more commonly used in studies of democracy, contains fewer 
democratic indicators.  Specifically, the Freedom House index reports a 
country’s freedom status (free, partly free, or not free) and its score on a scale of 
one to seven on political rights and civil liberties.  See FREEDOM HOUSE, 
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2013: DEMOCRATIC BREAKTHROUGHS IN THE BALANCE 
(2013), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW 
%202013%20Booklet.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).  In contrast, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index classifies countries in one of four categories 
(full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian 
regimes), ranks countries with an overall score on a descending scale, and also 
quantifies a country’s performance relative to other countries on five democratic 
indicators (electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political 
participation, political culture, and civil liberties).  See THE ECONOMIST 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra. 
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covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast 
majority of the world’s states (micro states are excluded).”17  The 
2012 Democracy Index allocates to each country a score on five 
measures of democracy—electoral process and pluralism, civil 
liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and 
political culture—and assigns a total score and overall rank for 
every country included in the study.  Each country is also classified 
under one of four types: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid 
regimes, or authoritarian regimes.  I examine the constitutions of 
countries classified as either full or flawed democracies with overall 
scores above 7.5 out of ten—thirty-six countries in total—to 
construct this new classification of formal amendment rules.18  My 
 
 17. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 16, at 1. 
 18. The Democracy Index defines full democracies as 
[c]ountries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties 
are respected, but these will also tend to be underpinned by a political 
culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy.  The functioning of 
government is satisfactory.  Media are independent and diverse. 
There is an effective system of checks and balances.  The judiciary is 
independent and judicial decisions are enforced.  There are only 
limited problems in the functioning of democracies. 
Id. at 28.  Flawed democracies “also have free and fair elections and even if 
there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil 
liberties will be respected.  However, there are significant weaknesses in other 
aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped 
political culture and low levels of political participation.”  Id.  I exclude hybrid 
regimes where  
[e]lections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them 
from being both free and fair.  Government pressure on opposition 
parties and candidates may be common.  Serious weaknesses are more 
prevalent than in flawed democracies—in political culture, functioning 
of government and political participation.  Corruption tends to be 
widespread and the rule of law is weak.  Civil society is weak.  
Typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the 
judiciary is not independent. 
Id.  I also exclude authoritarian regimes: 
In these states state political pluralism is absent or heavily 
circumscribed.  Many countries in this category are outright 
dictatorships.  Some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but 
these have little substance.  Elections, if they do occur, are not free 
and fair.  There is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil 
liberties.  Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups 
connected to the ruling regime.  There is repression of criticism of the 
government and pervasive censorship.  There is no independent 
judiciary. 
Id.  Given that my study examines formal amendment rules, I exclude full and 
flawed democracies with unwritten constitutions or constitutions without one or 
more master texts (like Israel and the United Kingdom), but I include 
democracies whose constitutions include one or more comprehensive 
constitutional acts (for instance, Canada and New Zealand) and where formal 
amendment occurs via constitutional act or fundamental law (for example, 
Austria, the Czech Republic, and Denmark). 
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analysis considers only current, not historical or superseded, 
democratic constitutions. 
The purpose of this Article is twofold.  My main purpose is to 
probe the structure and uses of formal amendment rules in 
constitutional democracies.  I deconstruct the architecture of formal 
amendment rules in constitutional democracies, as well as the ways 
political actors deploy those rules.  This Article endeavors to offer 
constitutional designers in both democratic and democratizing 
states a comprehensive roadmap to build or refine their own formal 
amendment rules.19  My second purpose is to generate an agenda for 
further research into the structure of formal amendment.  I identify 
patterns, similarities, and distinctions in order to generate renewed 
interest in the study of formal amendment from perspectives in 
constitutional design, law, history, and theory.  This Article is 
therefore both an inquiry into formal amendment and an invitation 
to further research. 
In Part I, I begin by explaining why existing formal amendment 
classifications are useful but lacking.  In Part II, I create a new 
classification to respond to the weaknesses of existing ones.  I posit 
that formal amendment rules are conceptually structured in three 
tiers: foundations, frameworks, and specifications.  I suggest that 
formal amendment rules are anchored either explicitly or implicitly 
in the foundational distinction between constitutional amendment 
and revision.  I also demonstrate that they operate pursuant to one 
of six amendment frameworks: comprehensive single-track, 
comprehensive multi-track, restricted single-track, restricted multi-
track, exceptional single-track, or exceptional multi-track.  I then 
show that formal amendment rules moreover consist of 
distinguishable but combinable specifications that supplement their 
foundations and frameworks: voting thresholds and quorum 
requirements, content restrictions, temporal requirements, electoral 
preconditions, and defense mechanisms. 
Part III then illustrates how constitutional designers may use 
this three-tiered classification of formal amendment rules to achieve 
such objectives as managing federalism, expressing constitutional 
values, enhancing or diminishing the judicial role, and pursuing 
democratic outcomes related to governance, constitutional 
endurance, and amendment difficulty.  I conclude with suggestions 
for future research into the design of formal amendment rules. 
 
 19. More cynically, constitutional autocrats could exploit the structure of 
formal amendment rules in constitutional democracies to clothe their regime in 
the legitimacy of entrenched amendment rules.  See KARL LOEWENSTEIN, 
POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 136 (2d ed. 1965) (“So deeply 
implanted is the conviction that a sovereign state must possess a written 
constitution that even modern autocracies feel compelled to pay tribute to the 
democratic legitimacy inherent in the written constitution.”). 
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I.  AMENDMENT CLASSIFICATIONS 
Existing formal amendment classifications have proven to be 
useful for limited purposes.  Some focus principally on the voting 
thresholds that distinguish one constitution’s formal amendment 
rules from another.  These classifications are helpful in 
understanding how constitutions incorporate majoritarian or 
supermajoritarian procedures in formal amendment.20  Other 
classifications are attentive to both voting thresholds and nonvoting 
criteria in formal amendment rules, and accordingly illustrate how 
both may be used in combination to design formal amendment 
rules.21  Still others classify formal amendment rules in tandem 
with methods of informal amendment in an effort to demonstrate 
the relationship between the emergence and frequency of informal 
amendment and the flexibility or rigidity of formal amendment 
rules.22  Yet all three types of existing formal amendment 
classifications are incomplete.  None serves as a comprehensive 
guide for constitutional designers to understand how formal 
amendment rules are structured or to operationalize that structure 
in designing their own rules of formal amendment. 
A. Voting Thresholds 
Formal amendment rules may be classified according to the 
quantum of agreement needed to alter the constitutional text.  All 
formal amendment rules in some way incorporate ordinary or 
extraordinary voting thresholds by representative assemblies or 
citizens.  Arend Lijphart has classified formal amendment rules 
according to voting thresholds in thirty-six countries identified as 
democracies by Freedom House.23  Lijphart identifies four categories 
of voting thresholds in his classification: approval by ordinary 
majority, two-thirds majority, less than two-thirds majority but 
more than an ordinary majority, and more than two-thirds 
majority.24  Lijphart finds that a plurality of the countries in his 
sample—fifteen of the thirty-six countries—entrench formal 
amendment rules requiring a two-thirds majority or its equivalent.25  
He finds that the next most popular are approval by supermajority 
greater than two-thirds and by supermajority greater than an 
ordinary majority but lower than two-thirds,26 and that the least 
 
 20. See infra Subpart I.A. 
 21. See infra Subpart I.B. 
 22. See infra Subpart I.C. 
 23. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 47–48 (2d ed. 2010). 
 24. Id. at 207.  In an addendum in the new edition of his study, Lijphart 
notes that fourteen countries use referenda as an absolute requirement of, or an 
optional alternative to, formal amendment rules.  Id. at 219. 
 25. Id. at 208. 
 26. Id. 
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common voting threshold for formal amendment is approval by 
ordinary majority.27 
Lijphart’s classification is helpful to constitutional designers for 
three primary reasons.  First, it orders three dozen constitutions 
whose formal amendment rules vary in many ways.  Second, it 
demonstrates how voting thresholds contribute to a constitution’s 
flexibility and rigidity.28  Lijphart contrasts how authorizing regular 
majorities to formally amend the constitution leads to constitutional 
flexibility, whereas limiting formal amendment to extraordinary 
majorities fosters constitutional rigidity.29  Third, Lijphart also 
connects constitutional malleability with the strength of judicial 
review.  He posits that “judicial review can work effectively only if it 
is backed up by constitutional rigidity and vice versa,”30 meaning 
that a judicial ruling is more likely to be durable where the rules of 
formal amendment are difficult.  He also uses his classification to 
suggest that “completely flexible constitutions and the absence of 
judicial review permit unrestricted majority rule.”31  His 
classification is instructive. 
Nevertheless, Lijphart’s classification cannot serve as a 
complete guide for constitutional designers planning to design their 
own formal amendment rules.  It does not account for the complexity 
of formal amendment rules, and its generality misses important 
distinctions even within the various voting thresholds according to 
which he classifies formal amendment rules.  For example, 
Lijphart’s classification does not consider limits to formal 
amendment rules such as unamendable constitutional provisions or 
periods of time during which the formal amendment rules are 
suspended—namely in emergencies or during the formal 
amendment process itself.  Constitutional designers cannot fully 
understand how to structure formal amendment rules without 
appreciating how these and other specifications fit within the 
amendment process. 
Moreover, Lijphart acknowledges that his classification does not 
reflect nuances within particular voting thresholds.  Specifically, 
Lijphart concedes that his classification does not account for 
different rules of formal amendment in the same constitution.32  
Lijphart has a two-part solution for this problem: “first, when 
alternative methods can be used, the least constraining methods 
should be counted,”33 and “second, when different rules apply to 
different parts of constitutions, the rule pertaining to amendments 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 206–11. 
 29. Id. at 204. 
 30. Id. at 219. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 209. 
 33. Id. 
W03_ALBERT  (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2014  10:54 AM 
920 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
of the most basic articles of the constitution should be counted.”34  
Lijphart’s classification therefore does not classify the multiple 
routes of formal amendment entrenched in a single constitution, nor 
does it classify the different formal amendment rules that apply to 
different sections of a constitution.  Yet alternative methods of 
amendment and exclusive or specially assigned amendment rules 
are fundamental distinctions among formal amendment rules that 
must be reflected in any classification if the purpose of the 
classification is to serve as a complete guide for constitutional 
designers in designing formal amendment rules of their own.  
Lijphart’s second solution—to apply the amendment rule for “the 
most basic articles”—compounds the problem with either 
subjectivity or error.  Sometimes formal amendment rules entrench 
alternative, exclusive, or specially assigned amendment rules.  That 
Lijphart does not classify these rules is problematic for identifying 
what he refers to as “the most basic articles” of the constitutions in 
his classification. 
Edward Schneier has developed a similar classification based on 
voting thresholds.35  Schneier classifies 101 constitutions into five 
categories and a total of nineteen subcategories.  His five main 
categories represent the voting thresholds pursuant to which the 
legislature may initiate a formal amendment: simple majority, sixty 
percent, sixty-five percent, two-thirds, and seventy-five percent.36  
Schneier divides each of these five categories into one of six 
subcategories that represent the methods and requirements for 
ratification (for instance, no further action, executive approval, or 
referendum).37  His classification, which is presented in a useful 
table, therefore allows us quickly to see that formal amendment in 
Argentina, for example, requires a legislative vote by a two-thirds 
majority with no further action, or that Russia requires a legislative 
vote of sixty percent followed by a constitutional convention.38 
Schneier’s objective is both to summarize how constitutions may 
be formally amended and to identify patterns in formal amendment.  
His classification only partly achieves its objectives.  Schneier 
concedes that his classification is limited because it “glosses over 
important nuances” in formal amendment rules.39  Although the 
classification does summarize methods of formal amendment, it is 
not complete.  As Schneier acknowledges, his classification does not 
reflect the full range of formal amendment methods: “many 
constitutions provide alternative methods including, most 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. EDWARD SCHNEIER, CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE 
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 222–25 (2006). 
 36. Id. at 224–25. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 223. 
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frequently, referendums.  This table reflects what I believe to be 
common practice of the method most frequently used in each 
country.”40  This raises a second limitation to Schneier’s 
classification: it is time bound.  That one method of formal 
amendment may today be common practice does not mean that it 
will remain common practice.  Infrequently used methods may 
become more frequently used, just as more frequently used methods 
may lapse into disuse.41  Relatedly, the implication of excluding 
infrequently used methods of formal amendment is to exclude 
certain formal amendment methods from his classification. 
The consequence of abstracting from specific rules in search of 
larger patterns is sometimes to elide over important details.  
Schneier’s classification is vulnerable to this criticism.  For example, 
Schneier classifies the United States under the two-thirds category 
with ratification by three-quarters of states.42  But this classification 
does not reflect Article V’s prohibition on formal amendments to the 
Equal Suffrage Clause without the consent of the affected state.43  
Similarly, Schneier classifies Canada and South Africa under the 
simple majority vote and seventy-five percent categories, 
respectively, and under the subcategories of approval by provincial 
legislatures or constitutional convention and approval by majority of 
provinces, respectively.44  Yet this classification does not reflect the 
escalating structure of both Canada and South Africa’s respective 
formal amendment rules, whose intricate design distinguishes it 
from many other constitutions.45  In addition, Schneier includes 
sham constitutions in his classification.46  Although sham 
constitutions entrench formal amendment rules, those rules do not 
actually bind political actors, nor do citizens accept them as accurate 
 
 40. Id. at 225. 
 41. I have elsewhere explored whether constitutional provisions may expire 
as a result of nonuse.  See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by 
Constitutional Desuetude, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2014) (developing the 
theory that written constitutions may be informally amended by desuetude); 
Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 1029 (2014) (inquiring whether Article V has fallen into disuse or 
desuetude as a result of its unsuccessful uses over the past generation). 
 42. SCHNEIER, supra note 35, at 225. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 44. SCHNEIER, supra note 35, at 224–25. 
 45. See infra Subpart II.B. 
 46. Schneier includes countries such as Iran, Syria, Eritrea, Pakistan, and 
Sudan in his classification.  See SCHNEIER, supra note 35, at 224–25.  Some of 
the countries in Schneier’s study qualify as “competitive authoritarian regimes” 
where “formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means 
of obtaining and exercising political authority,” but “[i]ncumbents violate those 
rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet 
conventional minimum standards for democracy.”  Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. 
Way, Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, 
13 J. DEMOCRACY 51, 52 (2002). 
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and legitimate reflections of how power is actually exercised and 
constrained.47 
Schneier’s classification nevertheless identifies useful patterns 
in formal amendment.  Schneier finds that most formal amendment 
procedures require a confirmatory vote, do not involve the executive 
branch, and establish a modal legislative vote of two-thirds.48  But 
he concludes that “the most interesting pattern” from his analysis 
“is that there are few discernible patterns.”49  Schneier observes that 
“[c]ommonwealth countries excepted, the rules seem neither more 
nor less restrictive in parliamentary as opposed to presidential 
systems, in older as against newer democracies, or by regions of the 
world.”50  That Schneier finds few deployable patterns of formal 
amendment design weakens the usefulness of his classification for 
constitutional designers seeking to understand how to structure 
their own rules of formal amendment. 
B. Voting Thresholds and Nonvoting Criteria 
Formal amendment rules may also be classified under a 
combination of voting thresholds and nonvoting criteria.  These 
classifications are more instructive to constitutional designers than 
those that classify formal amendment rules according only to voting 
thresholds because they offer a fuller view of amendment rules and 
illustrate the interrelations between voting thresholds and 
nonvoting criteria.  In his classification of formal amendment rules, 
Jon Elster identifies what he calls six “main hurdles” to formal 
amendment: absolute entrenchment, supermajority approval, higher 
quorum requirements, delays, subnational ratification, and 
referenda.51  These six categories represent both voting thresholds, 
which include supermajority approval, higher quorum requirements, 
subnational ratification and referenda, as well as nonvoting criteria 
that include absolute entrenchment and delays.  Elster’s 
classification therefore differs from Lijphart and Schneier’s 
respective classifications, neither of which uses a nonvoting criterion 
as a principal category in its classification of formal amendment 
rules. 
Elster constructs his classification to demonstrate the features 
that make constitutions more difficult to change than ordinary 
laws.52  Each of the six categories he identifies serves the function, 
either by design or effect, of controlling the pace of constitutional 
 
 47. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 
863, 880 (2013). 
 48. SCHNEIER, supra note 35, at 223. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, 
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 101 (2000). 
 52. Id. at 100–01. 
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change.  For instance, some constitutions absolutely entrench rights 
or structures to prohibit formal amendment.53  Similarly, both 
supermajority approval and higher quorum requirements complicate 
formal amendment, although unlike absolute entrenchment they do 
not make it impossible.54  Inserting delays in the process of formal 
amendment—for example, by requiring successive votes or imposing 
time limitations—likewise makes constitutions more difficult to 
formally amend than ordinary laws, as does requiring either 
subnational or referendal ratification.55 
A similar effort to classify formal amendment rules is Jan-Erik 
Lane’s six-part classification.56  Five of Lane’s six criteria overlap 
with Elster’s criteria, the only exception being Lane’s confirmatory 
votes in the place of Elster’s higher quorum requirements.57  Lane’s 
classification shows that the frequency of formal amendment is 
indirectly related to the constitutionally entrenched mechanisms 
favoring constitutional inertia.58  The more specific the rules of 
formal amendment and the more numerous the amendment 
mechanisms entrenched in the text, the greater the likelihood of 
constitutional inertia, argues Lane.59  These mechanisms are the 
criteria according to which Lane classifies formal amendment rules: 
unamendable rules, referenda, delays, qualified majorities, 
subnational ratification, and confirmatory votes.60 
In addition, Donald Lutz has classified formal amendment rules 
in his larger effort to measure amendment difficulty in thirty-two 
countries.61  Lutz identifies four general formal amendment 
strategies around which constitutional designers structure their 
formal amendment rules.  The first, legislative supremacy, reflects 
“unbridled dominance of the legislature by one legislative vote 
sufficient to amend the constitution.”62  The second, which he calls 
intervening election, requires the national legislature to vote to 
approve a formal amendment in two separate sessions divided by an 
election.63  The third, legislative complexity, is “usually 
characterized by multiple paths for the amending process, which 
 
 53. Id. at 102. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 103. 
 56. JAN-ERIK LANE, CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 41 (2d ed. 2011). 
 57. Compare id., with ELSTER, supra note 51, at 102. 
 58. LANE, supra note 56. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 (2006).  
Lutz compares national constitutions with state constitutions, but I hesitate to 
compare them insofar as subnational constitutions are associated with weaker 
government structures and rights as well as weaker formal amendment rules.  
See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1583, 1601 (2010). 
 62. LUTZ, supra note 61, at 174. 
 63. Id. at 175. 
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features the possibility of a referendum as a kind of threat to bypass 
the legislature.”64  The fourth amendment strategy is required 
referendum, which is used in constitutional states that 
institutionalize a referendum as a method of formal amendment.65 
Constitutional designers will find Elster’s, Lane’s, and Lutz’s 
classifications useful.  Elster explains with examples how those six 
categories may be combined to construct formal amendment rules.66  
He also advises designers that supermajority approval and delays 
are the most important categories for constitutional 
precommitment.67  Lane’s classification is a particularly useful 
resource for constitutional designers because it demonstrates how 
countries use multiple amendment mechanisms in many different 
combinations for different purposes, namely to protect minorities or 
to single out certain laws as special.68  Lutz’s classification evaluates 
formal amendment rules with an interest in understanding what 
contributes to amendment ease and difficulty, how to balance a 
written constitution’s flexibility and stability, and the extent to 
which one amendment strategy affects the amendment rate.69  Each 
of these classifications is a valuable resource for the design of formal 
amendment rules. 
But all three classifications remain incomplete.  Although they 
identify both voting thresholds and nonvoting criteria, they do not 
identify the larger structures around which formal amendment rules 
are built.  Voting thresholds and nonvoting criteria are only part of 
the architecture of formal amendment rules insofar as they operate 
within deeper amendment foundations and frameworks that arise 
prior to the constraining effect that voting thresholds and nonvoting 
criteria exert.  Formal amendment rules are therefore anchored in 
underlying foundations and frameworks that Elster, Lane, and Lutz 
do not identify, and which would be helpful for constitutional 
designers to understand before designing their formal amendment 
rules.  My objective in this Article is to illustrate and explain how 
formal amendment rules are structured, both in the ways that 
Elster, Lane, and Lutz identify and in those that they do not. 
C. Conceptual Categories 
Scholars have also ventured beyond the formal rules of 
constitutional amendment to posit broader conceptual categories of 
constitutional change.  Xenophon Contiades and Alkemen Fotiadou 
have developed a comprehensive conceptual classification of 
constitutional amendment comprising five models of constitutional 
 
 64. Id. at 176. 
 65. Id. at 364. 
 66. ELSTER, supra note 51, at 103. 
 67. Id. at 104. 
 68. See LANE, supra note 56, at 41–43. 
 69. LUTZ, supra note 61, at 176–77. 
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change: elastic, evolutionary, pragmatic, distrust, and direct-
democratic.70  These models are descriptive, neither normative nor 
mutually exclusive, and reflect the basic features of amendment in 
constitutional regimes for the purpose of comparing their functional 
advantages and limitations.71  As models, they are particularly 
useful in illustrating the interrelation between formal and informal 
amendment. 
Contiades and Fotiadou describe the elastic model of 
constitutional change as “operating under an unentrenched 
constitution, which may be altered through the normal lawmaking 
process, having no procedural limits and no eternity clauses.”72  
Anchored in parliamentary supremacy, the elastic model makes the 
legislative branch all powerful because “no obstacles to revision exist 
other than self-restraint flowing from legal culture, tradition, and 
political accountability.”73  The United Kingdom’s unwritten 
constitution is the paradigm of the elastic model.74  In contrast, the 
evolutionary model is characterized by a strong judiciary, a high 
incidence of informal change, and rigid formal amendment rules.75  
Under this model, the difficulty of formal amendment prompts and 
legitimates informal methods of amendment ranging from 
constitutional revolutions to incremental alterations: “Dynamic 
interpretation lies at the heart of that model, where constitutional 
change is meticulously construed through legal reasoning as befits 
judicial justification.  Judge-made change may not be attributed 
exclusively to the judge; political elites or the people might be the 
driving force behind judicial constitutional evolution.”76  Canada and 
the United States are two leading examples of this model.77 
Constitutional regimes under the pragmatic model generally 
resort to formal amendment for constitutional change.  Contiades 
and Fotiadou explain that “[t]he pragmatic model allows 
constitutional change to take place smoothly, with efficiency of 
formal change being the most striking feature of the way the system 
works.”78  Formal amendment rules are not usually difficult under 
this model.  But even if they are stringent, the consensual political 
culture facilitates necessary formal amendments: “The amending 
formula may be demanding, designed to secure constitutional 
stability; nevertheless, constant change is feasible due to a 
 
 70. Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, Models of Constitutional 
Change, in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 417, 440–57 (Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013). 
 71. Id. at 441. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 442. 
 75. Id. at 442–43. 
 76. Id. at 443. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 445. 
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consensual constitutional ethos.”79  Whereas the evolutionary model 
relies less on formal amendment than judicial interpretation to keep 
the constitution current, the pragmatic model relies less on the 
judiciary than formal amendment: “A strong judiciary is a feature of 
this model; nevertheless, there is no need for constitutional review 
to operate as a substitute for formal amendment.”80  In other words, 
“[J]udicial interpretation plays a complementary role and is not the 
primary vehicle of change,”81 conclude Contiades and Fotiadou.  
Germany illustrates this model.82 
The distrust and direct-democratic models of constitutional 
change are opposites.  The distrust model incorporates unamendable 
constitutional provisions, complicated formal amendment rules, and 
elite ratification into its procedures for constitutional change: 
“Demanding and complex amending formulas, political elite-driven 
change, and difficulty in reaching compromises on constitutional 
issues are the basic ingredients of the distrust model.”83  When 
entrenched within a polarized political culture, the distrust model 
exhibits conflict—and ultimately dysfunction—manifested by the 
near impossibility of formal amendment.84  Contiades and Fotiadou 
ascribe this model to Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the 
Netherlands.85  The direct-democratic model differs in several ways: 
it grants citizens the power both to initiate and to have the last 
word on constitutional change; it makes constitutional referenda 
mandatory; it eschews un-amendability; and it privileges popular 
participation over elite decision making.86  As Contiades and 
Fotiadou explain, “The design and qualities of referendums are of 
great importance, while the role of political elites and courts is 
influenced by the fact that the ultimate amending power lies with 
the people.”87  Switzerland is the leading example of this model.88 
Contiades and Fotiadou are not alone in developing a 
classification of constitutional change.  Carlo Fusaro and Dawn 
Oliver have advanced a theory of constitutional change that 
embraces both formal and informal amendment.89  They categorize 
the drivers of constitutional change (the people, the people and the 
courts, legislative assemblies, the courts, governments and their 
 
 79. Id. at 446. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 446–47. 
 83. Id. at 450. 
 84. Id. at 451–52. 
 85. Id. at 451–54. 
 86. Id. at 454. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 455. 
 89. See Carlo Fusaro & Dawn Oliver, Towards a Theory of Constitutional 
Change, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 405, 405–33 
(Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011). 
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leaders, and supranational institutions90), several legitimizing 
theories of constitutional change (sovereignty, parliamentary 
sovereignty, the constituting and constituted powers, representative 
versus direct democracy, grundnorm setting, and majoritarian and 
counter-majoritarian theories91), as well as the legal doctrines 
according to which we justify or approach constitutional change 
(positivism and neo-constitutionalism92).  Their classification cuts 
across formal and informal amendment and provides useful 
abstractions about constitutional change.  Yet they do not focus on 
the actual design of formal amendment rules.93 
I have also developed elsewhere a classification of constitutional 
amendment accounting for both formal and informal methods of 
constitutional change.  Drawing from written democratic 
constitutions, I posited three models of constitutional change: the 
textual model, the political model, and the substantive model.94  I 
classified Australia, Canada, and Switzerland as examples of the 
textual model,95 which holds that “the constitutional text enshrines 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for amending the 
constitution.”96  The political model, represented by the United 
States,97 recognizes that “amendments may spring from expressions 
of popular will that manifest themselves in dialogic exchanges 
among the political branches and the citizenry” and that 
amendments therefore “do not abide by the constitutionally 
enshrined procedures for amending the constitution.”98 The 
substantive model, in contrast, “chooses instead to elevate 
constitutional substance over political process, in so doing 
contemplating the possibility of invalidating constitutional 
amendments for departing from the spirit of the constitutional 
text—even if those amendments satisfy the textual requirements for 
constitutional entrenchment.”99  I referred to Germany, India, and 
South Africa as substantivist regimes.100 
 
 90. Id. at 414–16. 
 91. Id. at 416–21. 
 92. Id. at 421–23. 
 93. Fusaro and Oliver do, however, discuss some important details of 
formal amendment in an earlier chapter that is valuable and interesting, yet 
even this chapter does not explain how formal amendment rules are structured.  
See Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro, Changing Constitutions: Comparative 
Analysis, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 89, 
at 381, 391–97. 
 94. Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J. L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 5, 12–31 (2009). 
 95. Id. at 47. 
 96. Id. at 12. 
 97. Id. at 16. 
 98. Id. at 12. 
 99. Id. at 12–13. 
 100. Id. at 21. 
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My analysis stressed that these categories “are neither 
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, by which I mean not only that 
constitutional states may exhibit practices indicative of a fourth or 
nth constitutional amendment model but also that one 
constitutional state may exhibit amendment practices aligned with 
more than one model.”101  The classification was designed to serve a 
narrow purpose: to identify “sufficiently distinguishable” models in 
order “to strike instructive contrasts that may help illuminate the 
competing theories of sovereignty that underpin the amendment 
practices of constitutional states.”102  In retrospect, I would revise 
my classification, but not in material ways that would undermine 
my two conclusions: first, that formal amendment rules “either 
conceal much about the actual practice of constitutional amendment 
or simply do not accurately reflect the political norms that shape 
and inform the practice of constitutional amendment,”103 and 
second, that “the theory and practice of constitutionalism is at once 
rooted in constitutional texts, public institutions, judicial 
interpretation, political practice, extratextual customs, and citizens 
themselves.”104  Nevertheless, my classification gave insufficient 
attention to the design of formal amendment rules.  Contiades and 
Fotiadou’s classification exhibits the same weakness as Fusaro and 
Oliver’s own, and neither their classifications nor mine can serve as 
a complete guide for constitutional designers tasked with designing 
formal amendment rules. 
II.  THE THREE TIERS OF FORMAL AMENDMENT RULES 
Existing classifications do not offer directions for the design of 
formal amendment rules.  We can facilitate this design task only by 
explicating the actual structure of formal amendment rules.  In this 
Article, I construct a new classification intended to guide 
constitutional designers through the process of constructing formal 
amendment rules.  I demonstrate that formal amendment rules in 
democratic constitutions are structured around three tiers, with 
options within each of these tiers: one of two fundamental 
foundations, one of six operational frameworks, and a combination 
of supplementary specifications.  I analyze formal amendment rules 
in the world’s highest-performing constitutional democracies as 
measured by the 2012 Democracy Index.105  I focus only on full or 
flawed democracies earning scores above 7.5 out of ten, and I 
exclude democratic regimes without a master-text written 
constitution.  However, I include democratic regimes with strong 
 
 101. Id. at 12. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 47. 
 104. Id. 
 105. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 16. 
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traditions of written and unwritten constitutionalism, and I also 
include democratic regimes where the constitution consists of 
constitutional statutes.  I also include democratic regimes where 
formal amendment occurs via constitutional act or fundamental law.  
These criteria yield a study sample of thirty-six countries ranked in 
the 2012 Democracy Index’s top forty. 
TABLE 1: STUDY SAMPLE FROM THE 2012 DEMOCRACY INDEX  
(WITH COUNTRY RANKING) 
A. The Foundations of Formal Amendment 
Formal amendment rules are anchored in the foundational 
distinction between amendment and revision.  The distinction holds 
that amendment alters the constitution within the existing 
framework of government while revision amounts to a fundamental 
change that departs from the presuppositions of the constitution and 
may even reshape its framework.106  As Thomas Cooley observed in 
the late nineteenth century, “[An amendment m]ust be in harmony 
with the thing amended, so far at least as concerns its general spirit 
and purpose.  It must not be something so entirely incongruous that, 
instead of amending or reforming it, it overthrows or revolutionizes 
 
 106. WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND 
MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 498 n.4 (2007); Miriam Galston, 
Theocracy in America: Should Core First Amendment Values Be Permanent?, 37 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 65, 92–93 (2009); Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1751 (2005).  This seems consistent with the etymological 
root of the word “amend,” which derives from the Latin verb emendare, meaning 
“to free from fault” or “to put right.”  See BRYAN A. GARNER, MODERN AMERICAN 
USAGE 41 (3d ed. 2009). 
1 2 3 4 
Norway Sweden Iceland Denmark 
5 6 7 8 
New Zealand Australia Switzerland Canada 
9 10 11 12 
Finland Netherlands Luxembourg Austria 
13 14 15 17 
Ireland Germany Malta Czech Republic 
18 18 20 21 
Uruguay Mauritius South Korea United States 
22 23 24 25 
Costa Rica Japan Belgium Spain 
26 26 28 28 
Cape Verde Portugal France Slovenia 
30 31 32 33 
Botswana South Africa Italy Greece 
34 35 36 38 
Estonia Taiwan Chile India 
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it.”107  More recently, John Rawls has defined an amendment as 
“adjust[ing] basic constitutional values to changing political and 
social circumstances”108 and “adapt[ing] basic institutions in order to 
remove weaknesses that come to light in subsequent constitutional 
practice.”109 
1. Formal Amendment and Constitutional Revision 
Some democratic constitutions use the term “revision” but do 
not entrench the conceptual distinction between amendment and 
revision pursuant to which different procedures apply to amending 
or revising the constitution.110  These constitutions use the term 
“revision” to mean “amendment.”111  Other democratic constitutions 
may be read as acknowledging or suggesting a distinction between 
amendment and revision but do not specify different procedures for 
each process.112  Still other democratic constitutions make explicit 
the conceptual distinction between amendment and revision and 
accordingly entrench procedures for amendment that differ from 
those that must be used for revision.113  These constitutions 
illustrate one of the two foundations in the design of formal 
amendment rules: constitutions that entrench rules for both 
amendment and revision.  Finally, some constitutions adopt a 
middle position between entrenching and leaving unstated the 
distinction between amendment and revision: they insist that formal 
 
 107. Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 
MICH. L.J. 109, 118 (1893). 
 108. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 238 (2d ed. 2005). 
 109. Id. at 239. 
 110. See 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 2, art. 110 (Greece); 
CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 114; CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA 
PORTUGUESA,  arts. 286–89. 
 111. Some constitutions use the term “reform” instead of “amendment” or 
“revision.”  For example, the Chilean Constitution refers to the “reform of the 
Constitution.” CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 127–
29.  Where constitutions use “reform” without distinguishing it from another 
type of alteration, I interpret it to refer to “amendment.”  The analysis would 
differ if, for example, the constitutional text distinguished between “partial 
reform” and “general reform,” in which case the former would mean 
“amendment” and the latter would mean “revision.”  Textual inquiry is useful to 
distinguish among different formal amendment designs, but it is useful, 
perhaps necessary, to look beyond the text into constitutional practice and 
interpretation in order to understand the domestic significance of these various 
terms. 
 112. See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, art. 309, para. 1; 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1967, art. 331 (Uru.). 
 113. See BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBl No. 
1/1920, as last amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl I No. 2/1983, 
art. 44, ¶ 2 (Austria); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, 
arts. 195–96; CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.], B.O.E. nn.166–68, Dec. 29, 1978 
(Spain); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 
192–95 (Switz.). 
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amendments conform to substantive standards but do not specify 
separate procedures for adopting a formal change that violates those 
substantive standards. 
TABLE 2: AMENDMENT AND REVISION IN DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS 
Constitution suggests both 
amendment and revision, but does 
not entrench the distinction. 
Cape Verde 
Uruguay 
Constitution expressly recognizes 
both amendment and revision, and 





Constitution establishes substantive 
standard that formal amendment 
must respect but does not specify 
consequence of adopting amendment 




For example, the Swiss Constitution entrenches the conceptual 
distinction between amendment and revision.  It distinguishes 
between “total” and “partial” revision, the former referring to 
revision and the latter to amendment: “The Federal Constitution 
may at any time be subjected to a total or a partial revision.”114  
Total revision “may be proposed by the People or by one of the 
Chambers, or may be decreed by the Federal Parliament”115 but 
“[t]he mandatory provisions of international law may not be 
violated.”116  In contrast, partial revision “may be requested by the 
People, or be decreed by the Federal Parliament,”117 but “[a] partial 
revision must respect the principle of the unity of subject matter; it 
may not violate the mandatory provisions of international law.”118  
The Swiss Constitution establishes a further restriction on partial 
revision: “A popular initiative for partial revision must, moreover, 
respect the principle of the unity of form.”119  Therefore whereas 
international law is the only textual restriction on total revision, the 
Constitution constrains partial revision in more ways—according to 
subject matter, unity of form, and international law—consistent 
 
 114. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 192, para. 1 
(Switz.). 
 115. Id. at art. 193, para. 1. 
 116. Id. at art. 193, para. 4. 
 117. Id. at art. 194, para. 1. 
 118. Id. at art. 194, para. 2. 
 119. Id. at art. 194, para. 3. 
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with the use of amendment for only narrow, not sweeping, 
changes.120 
Similarly, the Costa Rican Constitution distinguishes between a 
“partial amendment” and a “general amendment.”  The Constitution 
specifies that “the Legislative Assembly may partially amend this 
Constitution complying strictly with the following provisions,” going 
on to list eight requirements for effecting a partial amendment, 
including who may initiate a partial amendment and the requisite 
voting thresholds, as well as quorum requirements and time 
limits.121  The Constitution also outlines a special procedure for 
making a general amendment that does more than merely fine tune 
the text, which states: “A general amendment of this Constitution 
can only be made by a Constituent Assembly called for the purpose.  
A law calling such Assembly shall be passed by a vote of no less than 
two thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly and 
does not require the approval of the Executive Branch.”122  That the 
Constitution sets strict requirements for partial amendment is 
consistent with the limited uses of amendment, as opposed to the 
more transformative changes possible with revision, which may be 
authorized only by an extraordinary body or procedure—namely a 
Constituent Assembly in Costa Rica or the people in Switzerland. 
2. Formal Amendment and Implicit Limitations 
But most democratic constitutions—thirty out of the thirty-six 
in this study—leave unstated the distinction between amendment 
and revision.123  These constitutions neither recognize nor imply 
 
 120. For helpful context to the international law restriction in the Swiss 
Constitution, see Yaniv Roznai, The Theory and Practice of “Supra-
Constitutional” Limits on Constitutional Amendments, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
557, 591 (2013). 
 121. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 195. 
 122. Id. at art. 196. 
 123. See U.S. CONST. art. V; AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128; 1994 CONST. 
art. 195 (Belg.); CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA § 89; Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, s. 38–48 (U.K.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA 
REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, arts. 309–12, 314; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA 
REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 127–29; GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] [CONSTITUTION] Lov 
nr. 88 (Den.); PÕHISEADUS [CONSTITUTION], ss 161–68 (Est.); SUOMEN 
PERUSTALSKI [CONSTITUTION], 6 luku 73 (Fin.); 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.); 
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. VII, art. 79 (Ger.); 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] 2, 
art. 110 (Greece); STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝÐVELDISINS ÍSLANDS [CONSTITUTION], art. 79 
(Ice.); INDIA CONST. art. 368; IR. CONST., 1937, art. 46; Art. 138 Costituzione 
[Cost.] [Constitution] (It.); NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 
(Japan); CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 114; KOSTITUZZJONI TA’ MALTA 
[CONSTITUTION], art. 66; MAURITIUS CONST., art. 47; Grondwet voor het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [GW.] [CONSTITUTION] arts. 137–42 (Neth.); 
Constitution Act, 1986, pt. 3 s 15 (N.Z.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA 
PORTUGUESA,  arts. 285–86; USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [CONSTITUTION] arts. 
168–71 (Slovn.); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, sec. 74; DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB 
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that amendment and revision entail different consequences and 
outcomes.  The standard democratic design instead defines formal 
alteration exclusively with regard to amendment.  Yet it does not 
follow from the non-entrenchment of the distinction between 
amendment and revision that the distinction does not exist or that 
its non-entrenchment will foreclose its emergence from other 
sources.  For example, the natural right of revolution is not usually 
entrenched in constitutions,124 yet it remains an implicit restriction 
against which formal amendment rules and constitutions 
themselves are defenseless.125  I will later show why we should not 
likewise presume that the distinction between amendment and 
revision does not exist where it is not entrenched.126 
TABLE 3: UNSTATED DISTINCTION BETWEEN AMENDMENT AND 
REVISION IN DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS 
Australia Belgium Botswana Canada Cape Verde 
Chile Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Germany Greece Iceland India Ireland 











There are risks to leaving implicit what is subject to 
amendment and revision.  Disagreement is bound to occur regarding 
which constitutional changes work a fundamental redesign to the 
constitution and which are less fundamental.  As Laurence Tribe 
has written in the context of the U.S. Constitution, 
 
 
[HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 98 (S. Kor.); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 
[CONSTITUTION] 8, arts. 14–16 (Swed.); MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 174 
(1947) (Taiwan); CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1967, art. 331 (Uru.). 
 124. Roughly twenty percent of the world’s constitutions entrench the right 
of revolution in some form.  See Tom Ginsburg et al., When to Overthrow Your 
Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
1184, 1217–18 (2013).  But note that the Mexican Constitution contemplates 
restricting this right by establishing a formal constitutional rule against 
revolution.  See Constitución Política de los Estados Mexicanos [C.P.], as 
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917, art. 135 
(Mex.). 
 125. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: THE SECOND TREATISE OF 
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 246–47 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1947) (1690). 
 126. See infra Subpart III.C. 
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Not only is the list of fundamental constitutional norms open 
to debate, but the very identity of the Constitution—the body 
of textual and historical materials from which the norms are to 
be extracted and by which their application is to be guided—is 
itself a matter that cannot be objectively deduced or passively 
discerned in a viewpoint-free way.127 
  Melissa Schwartzberg echoes this point, observing that 
“scholars dispute what constitutes these substantive limits, which 
suggests the broader contestability of these sorts of claims[,]”128 and 
concluding that “[e]fforts at restricting the boundaries of 
constitutional amendment are bound to be challengeable, and 
reasonable people are likely to disagree about what constitutes an 
unalterable principle.”129  The challenge for constitutional designers 
is therefore to find the right balance between giving clarity to their 
successors and accommodating the future contestability of 
constitutional identity.130 
Some constitutions adopt a middle position between 
entrenching different procedures for amendment and revision and 
leaving the distinction unstated.  These constitutions insist that 
formal amendments must conform to certain substantive standards, 
but they do not state the consequences of adopting a formal 
 
 127. Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a 
Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 440 (1983).  More recently, 
however, Professor Tribe has acknowledged that 
it may well be that some properly adopted formal amendments could 
themselves be deemed “unconstitutional” because of their radical 
departure from premises too deeply embedded to be repudiated 
without a full-blown revolution.  Thus, for instance, an amendment 
repealing the Article IV guarantee of a “republican” form of 
government and simultaneously making membership in Congress a 
matter of heredity, rather than of election by “the People,” might well 
be deemed void regardless of its process of adoption, as might an 
amendment that repudiates the rule of law or abandons the 
indissoluble character of the Union. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 33–34 (2008). 
 128. MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE 148 (2007). 
 129. Id. 
 130. This challenge for constitutional designers also touches upon subject-
matter restrictions.  See infra Subpart II.C.2.  Where constitutional designers 
designate a particular provision as unamendable, political actors could 
nevertheless use the regular procedures of formal amendment to amend that 
nominally unamendable provision.  This could work an implicit constitutional 
revision.  Analogously, where constitutional designers do not designate a 
particular provision as unamendable, yet that provision is or becomes central to 
the regime’s political culture, one could argue that such a change would 
likewise work an implicit constitutional revision.  Akhil Amar has suggested 
that using Article V to repeal the First Amendment would have this effect.  See 
Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044–45 n.1 (1988).  John Rawls has taken a 
similar view of the First Amendment, which he views as having been “validated 
by long historical practice.”  RAWLS, supra note 108, at 239. 
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amendment that violates those standards, and they also do not 
entrench a separate procedure for revision.  This suggests three 
points: formal amendment cannot be the vehicle to adopt a provision 
in violation of those standards; formal alteration of those standards 
would amount to something more than an amendment; and those 
standards may be violated, but only by revision, which would result 
in adopting an altogether new constitution. 
For instance, the Norwegian Constitution entrenches formal 
amendment rules but insists that an amendment “must never, 
however, contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution, 
but solely relate to modifications of particular provisions which do 
not alter the spirit of the Constitution.”131  The Constitution insists 
that formal amendments cannot violate this substantive standard, 
but it does not state a procedure for adopting formal alterations that 
do.  It leaves implicit the power of political actors to revise the 
Constitution in contravention of this standard.  Were political actors 
to “alter the spirit of the Constitution,” the result would be 
something more than an amendment, and indeed could not be 
achieved through the formal amendment process.132  The only 
alternative appears to be the adoption of a new constitution. 
Similarly, the Czech Republic’s Constitution entrenches the 
middle position: it neither specifies different alteration procedures 
for amendment and revision nor does it leave the distinction 
unstated.  It instead suggests that the regular formal amendment 
process is insufficient to formalize changes that will work something 
more than an amendment to the constitution.  Its text states that 
“the substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State may 
not be amended,”133 and “interpretation of legal rules may not be 
used as authorization to eliminate or imperil the foundations of the 
democratic State.”134  It is possible to imagine an alteration that 
would conform to these standards of democracy.  But where an 
alteration would violate those standards, it would be properly 
described as a revision, not an amendment.  Neither the Czech nor 
the Norwegian Constitutions specify what the revision process 
entails, but we can infer that their constitutional designers intended 
those changes to occur only in a constitutional redesign. 
 
 131. GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] [CONSTITUTION] § 112 (Nor.).  This absolute 
prohibition on amendments violating the spirit of the Constitution does not 
grant interpretive authority to courts; it is directed to the national legislature, 
which holds controlling authority in interpreting the Constitution.  See Yaniv 
Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and 
Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657,  670 n.91 (2013). 
 132. GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] § 112 (Nor.). 
 133. Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of 
the Czech Republic], art. 9, para. 2. 
 134. Id. at art. 9, para. 3. 
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B. The Frameworks of Formal Amendment 
Written democratic constitutions generally embed one of six 
formal amendment frameworks into their formal amendment 
foundations.  The frameworks of formal amendment vary according 
to the number of procedures available for formally amending the 
constitution and the range of the constitutional provisions open to 
formal amendment by those procedures.  The first important 
observation about formal amendment frameworks is that formal 
amendment rules may entrench either one or more procedures for 
formally amending the constitution.  I divide these procedures into 
two categories: single-track, for formal amendment rules 
entrenching only one procedure for formal amendment; and multi-
track, for formal amendment rules entrenching more than one 
procedure for formal amendment.  Formal amendment procedures 
may differ with respect to the institutions authorized to initiate a 
formal amendment, to amend an amendment proposal, and to ratify 
an amendment.135 
The second important observation about formal amendment 
frameworks is that formal amendment rules may also authorize the 
use of all, some, or one of these procedures of formal amendment to 
amend all, some, or one of the provisions entrenched in the 
constitution.  I divide the range of constitutional provisions open to 
formal amendment into three categories: comprehensive, under 
which all amendable provisions are susceptible to amendment by all 
available procedures for formal amendment; restricted, pursuant to 
which each amendable provision is made amendable by a designated 
procedure for formal amendment; and exceptional, which creates 
one amendment procedure of general application and a second 
procedure exclusively for one constitutional provision or a set of 
related provisions.  These criteria generate six possible 











 135. For purposes of my classification, I do not distinguish the power to 
initiate an amendment within the same branch of government (for instance as 
between the two houses of the bicameral national legislature) but I do 
distinguish the power to initiate an amendment among branches of the national 
government (for instance as between the president and the legislature) and 
between national and subnational government institutions (for instance as 
between the national and subnational legislatures). 
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TABLE 4: FORMAL AMENDMENT FRAMEWORKS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACIES 





















C. Formal Amendment Procedures (Single- or Multi-Track), the 
Scope of Their Use (Comprehensive, Restricted, or Exceptional), and 
Representative Democratic Constitutions 
Below, I describe these six formal amendment frameworks with 
reference to currently-in-force democratic constitutions.  I also 
categorize each of the thirty-six democratic constitutions in this 
study.  To summarize, thirteen adopt the comprehensive multi-track 
framework (Costa Rica, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Uruguay), ten adopt the comprehensive single-track framework 
(Belgium, Cape Verde, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal), five adopt the 
restricted single-track framework (Botswana, India, Malta, 
Mauritius, South Africa), four adopt the restricted multi-track 
framework (Canada, Chile, Estonia, Spain), three adopt the 
exceptional single-track framework (Australia, Austria, Iceland), 
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1. Comprehensive Single-Track Amendment 













Of the thirty-six democratic constitutions, ten entrench the 
comprehensive single-track framework.136  This framework has the 
virtue of clarity: there exists only one formal amendment procedure 
(it is single-track) and it applies to all amendable constitutional 
provisions (it is comprehensive).  The German Basic Law illustrates 
the paradigmatic example of the comprehensive single-track 
framework.  The German Basic Law’s text allows amendments “only 
by a law expressly amending or supplementing its text”137 and 
specifies that there is only one way to make a formal amendment: 
“Any such law shall be carried by two thirds of the Members of the 
Bundestag and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat.”138  The 
rule is therefore clear: to formally amend the German Basic Law, 
two-thirds of both houses of the national legislature must approve 
the amendment.139  Japan likewise follows the comprehensive 
single-track framework.140  To formally amend the Constitution, the 
bicameral national legislature must initiate the amendment process 
with a two-thirds vote, the proposal must be ratified in a 
referendum by a majority vote, and the Emperor must then 
promulgate the amendment.141  This single-track framework is 




 136. See 1994 CONST. art. 195 (Belg.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO 
VERDE, arts. 309–12, 314; Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky 
[Constitution of the Czech Republic], art. 39, para. 4; GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] Lov 
nr. 88 (Den.); GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. VII, art. 79 (Ger.); IR. 
CONST., 1937, art. 46; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], art. 96 (Japan); Constitution 
Act, 1986, pt. 3 s 15 (N.Z.); GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] § 112 (Nor.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA 
REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA,  arts. 285–86. 
 137. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] 
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. VII, art. 79 (Ger.). 
 138. Id. at art. 79, para. 2. 
 139. Id. 
 140. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], art. 96 (Japan). 
 141. Id. 
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2. Comprehensive Multi-Track Amendment 
TABLE 7: COMPREHENSIVE MULTI-TRACK FRAMEWORK IN 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS 
Costa Rica Finland France Greece Italy 




Switzerland Taiwan Uruguay   
 
The comprehensive multi-track framework differs from its 
single-track counterpart only insofar as it offers political actors more 
than one procedure to make a formal amendment to the 
constitution.  I include in this framework all alternative amendment 
procedures, whether they are genuine alternatives or whether they 
authorize alternative routes in the event of an amendment failure 
under another route.  Under the comprehensive multi-track 
framework, political actors may deploy any of the available formal 
amendment procedures to make a formal amendment to any 
amendable provision in the constitutional text.  All formal 
amendment procedures are equally useable, and any may be used to 
amend any amendable constitutional provision.  Thirteen of the 
thirty-six democracies in this study have adopted the comprehensive 
multi-track framework of formal amendment.142 
The French Constitution is a prominent example.  Amendments 
may be initiated by either the President or members of the national 
legislature.143  An amendment proposal may take the form of a 
governmental or private member’s bill,144 the former initiated by a 
member of the cabinet and the latter by a noncabinet 
parliamentarian.  Both houses of the national legislature must then 
approve the amendment proposal, which must subsequently be 
ratified in a national referendum.145 
 
 142. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, arts. 195–
96; SUOMEN PERUSTALSKI, 6 luku 73 (Fin.); 1958 CONST. art. 90 (Fr.); 1975 
SYNTAGMA [SYN.] 2, art. 110 (Greece); Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); 
CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 114; Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden [GW.] arts. 137–42 (Neth.); USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE, arts. 
168–71 (Slovn.); DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] art. 98 (S. Kor.); 
REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 8, arts. 14–16 (Swed.); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 
18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 192–95 (Switz.); MINGUO XIANFA art. 174 (1947) 
(Taiwan); CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1967, art. 331 (Uru.). 
 143. 1958 CONST. art. 90 (Fr.). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  But not all amendment proposals must be ratified by referendum.  
The French Constitution authorizes the President to unilaterally bypass the 
referendum requirement for governmental amendment bills; in those cases, the 
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This framework is multi-track because it creates multiple ways 
to formally amend the constitution.  Under the comprehensive 
multi-track framework, political actors have the choice of at least 
two paths to propose and/or ratify a formal amendment.  Recall, in 
contrast, that a constitution entrenching the comprehensive single-
track framework (for instance, the German Basic Law) gives 
political actors no such choice because the comprehensive single-
track framework offers only one procedure to formally amend the 
constitution.  Yet the comprehensive multi- and single-track 
frameworks share the feature of general applicability.  Just as the 
single amendment procedure within the comprehensive single-track 
framework may be used to amend all amendable constitutional 
provisions, the multiple amendment procedures within the 
comprehensive multi-track framework may likewise be used to 
amend all amendable constitutional provisions.  The multiple 
amendment procedures within the multi-track frameworks are 
therefore equal insofar as they are equally deployable to amend any 
of the amendable constitutional provisions entrenched in the written 
constitution.146 
The Italian Constitution similarly exhibits the comprehensive 
multi-track framework.147  Formal amendments must be proposed 
and adopted in the bicameral national legislature and approved by 
an absolute majority of each house in two consecutive votes held 
within three months.148  If the houses approve the amendment 
proposal by a supermajority of two-thirds, the amendment becomes 
effective.149  But if the amendment proposal fails to secure 
supermajority approval in both houses, it may be subject to the 
additional step of a referendum.  The proposal must be ratified in a 
national referendum if such a request is made by one-fifth of one of 
the two houses, 500,000 voters, or five of the autonomous regional 
councils.150  The formal amendment rules require the amendment 
proposal to win majority support in the referendum to become 
effective.151  Like the formal amendment procedures in the French 
Constitution, these procedures provide more than one way to 
 
President must submit the approved governmental amendment bill to 
Parliament convened in Congress, where it must be ratified by a three-fifths 
majority.  Id. 
 146. But the 1962 amendment authorizing the direct election of the 
President by national vote was adopted in apparent violation of the French 
Constitution’s formal amendment rules.  See Martin A. Rogoff, Fifty Years of 
Constitutional Evolution in France: The 2008 Amendments and Beyond, JUS 
POLITICUM, No. 6, 2011, at 1, 13 (Fr.), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1793210. 
 147. Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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formally amend the constitution, and they may each be used to 
formally amend any of the amendable constitutional provisions. 
3. Restricted Single-Track Amendment 
TABLE 8: RESTRICTED SINGLE-TRACK FRAMEWORK IN DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTIONS 




In contrast, the restricted single-track framework creates more 
than one amendment procedure but expressly designates which of 
these amendment procedures must be used to formally amend 
specific provisions of the constitution.  Although it consists of more 
than one formal amendment procedure, it is restricted because each 
amendment procedure is deployable only for specifically enumerated 
provisions of the constitution.  It is single track only insofar as it 
provides a single procedure for amending specifically enumerated 
constitutional provisions.  The restricted single-track framework is 
distinguishable from the comprehensive single-track framework 
according to the number of amendment procedures it entrenches: 
the comprehensive single-track framework provides only one 
amendment procedure to formally amend all amendable 
constitutional provisions, whereas the restricted single-track 
framework creates more than one formal amendment procedure to 
amend designated provisions.  The difference between the restricted 
single-track framework and the comprehensive multi-track 
framework turns on how their various amendment procedures may 
be deployed.  Under the restricted single-track framework, the 
various amendment procedures are expressly keyed to specific 
constitutional provisions.  In contrast, the comprehensive multi-
track framework contemplates the use of any of the multiple 
amendment procedures to formally amend any amendable 
constitutional provision. 
Five democratic constitutions entrench the restricted single-
track framework.152  Unlike the multiple amendment procedures 
under the French Constitution’s comprehensive multi-track 
framework, the multiple amendment procedures under the South 
African Constitution’s restricted single-track framework cannot be 
used to amend all constitutional provisions.  The Constitution 
creates three amendment procedures, each of which is linked to 
different classes of provisions.153  The lowest amendment threshold 
 
 152. See CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA § 89; INDIA CONST. art. 368; 
KOSTITUZZJONI TA’ MALTA, art. 66; MAURITIUS CONST., art. 47; S. AFR. CONST., 
1996, sec. 74. 
 153. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, sec. 74. 
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requires two-thirds approval in the National Assembly.154  It is the 
Constitution’s general amending formula and may be used to 
formally amend all provisions not specially assigned to a higher 
amendment threshold.  The intermediate amendment threshold 
requires two-thirds approval in both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces.155  This procedure must be used to 
formally amend the Bill of Rights, as well as any amendment that 
concerns the National Council of Provinces, modifies provincial 
rights or prerogatives, or changes a constitutional provision relating 
specifically to a provincial matter.156  The most exacting formal 
amendment requirements require approval by three-quarters and 
two-thirds, respectively, in the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces.157  This amendment threshold governs 
amendments to the Constitution’s statement of constitutional values 
as well as to the highest amendment threshold itself.158 
We can perceive in the South African Constitution the two 
defining characteristics of the restricted single-track framework of 
formal amendment—multiplicity and rigidity.  First, the restricted 
single-track framework entrenches more than one procedure to 
amend the constitution.  But unlike the comprehensive multi-track 
framework, whose multiple procedures may be used to amend any of 
the constitution’s amendable constitutional provisions, the restricted 
single-track framework’s multiple procedures may not be used to 
freely amend all of the constitution’s amendable provisions.  Second, 
we must note the rigidity of the framework.  Its multiple 
amendment procedures are designated for specific constitutional 
provisions.  Where, for instance, a constitution entrenching the 
restricted single-track framework creates three amendment 
procedures, each of the three procedures is expressly connected to a 
particular class of constitutional provisions and those provisions 
alone. 
 
 154. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, sec. 74, para. 3. 
 155. Id. at sec. 74, para. 2. 
 156. Id. at sec. 74, paras. 2–3. 
 157. Id. at sec. 74, paras. 1–2. 
 158. Id. at sec. 74, para. 1.  The Constitution’s statement of constitutional 
values proclaims that 
[t]he Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement 
of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. (b) 
Non-racialism and non-sexism. (c) Supremacy of the constitution and 
the rule of law. (d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters 
roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic 
government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
Id. at sec. 1. 
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4. Restricted Multi-Track Amendment 
TABLE 9: RESTRICTED MULTI-TRACK FRAMEWORK IN DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTIONS 
Canada Chile Estonia Spain 
 
Of the thirty-six democratic constitutions in this study, four 
entrench the restricted multi-track framework.159  This framework 
combines the restrictions of specifically designated amendment 
procedures with multiple procedures for amending those specific 
provisions.  Whereas the restricted single-track framework creates 
only one formal amendment procedure for amending specifically 
enumerated constitutional provisions, the restricted multi-track 
framework provides more than one procedure for amending those 
specifically enumerated provisions. 
The Canadian Constitution provides an illustration.  Its text 
entrenches five amendment procedures.160  First, the method of 
provincial unilateral amendment authorizes a provincial legislature 
to formally amend its provincial constitution by passing a law in the 
normal course of the legislative process.161  This procedure may be 
initiated only in the subnational legislature concerned.  Second, 
under the method of unilateral federal amendment, Parliament may 
pass a simple law to amend the Constitution.162  Either house of 
Parliament may initiate the amendment. 
Each of the following three procedures may be initiated by 
either house of the national legislature or a subnational 
legislature.163  First, under the method of parliamentary 
amendment with the approval of the affected provincial legislature, 
both houses of Parliament are required to adopt a resolution by 
majority vote followed by a majority vote of the legislature whose 
subnational unit is affected by the amendment.164  Second, under 
the general amending formula, both houses of Parliament are 
required to adopt a resolution by majority vote followed by 
resolutions from two-thirds of provincial legislatures whose 
aggregate population represents at least fifty percent of the national 
 
 159. See Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, 
s. 38–48 (U.K.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] artS. 
127–29; PÕHISEADUS, ss 161–68 (Est.); CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.], B.O.E. 
nn.166–68, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
 160. See generally, Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act, 1982, s. 38–48 (U.K.). 
 161. Id. at. s. 45 (“Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may 
exclusively make laws amending the constitution of the province.”). 
 162. Id. at s. 44. 
 163. See id. at s. 46. 
 164. Id. at s. 43. 
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population.165  Finally, under the method of unanimity, both houses 
of Parliament are required to adopt a resolution by majority vote 
followed by majority resolutions from each of the provincial 
legislatures.166  These are the five distinguishable formal 
amendment procedures under the Canadian Constitution.167 
Each of Canada’s five formal amendment procedures is specially 
designated for amending specific constitutional provisions.  The first 
method—unilateral provincial amendment—applies to all provincial 
matters except those specifically assigned to higher amendment 
thresholds.168  Canadian political actors may use the method of 
unilateral federal amendment to make formal amendments to the 
federal executive government or to either of the two houses of 
Parliament.169  They may use the third mode of amendment—
Parliament and the affected province—to alter provincial 
boundaries or to change the use of English or French within a 
province.170  The fourth mode of amendment—Parliament and a 
supermajority of provinces—is the Constitution’s default 
amendment procedure and must be used to make a formal 
amendment to such provisions, including provincial representation 
in the House of Commons and the Senate, the powers of the Senate 
and the way Senators are selected, and the creation of new 
provinces.171  The fifth mode of amendment—unanimous consent—
must be used to make formal amendments to provisions like the 
monarchy, the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, and the 
procedures for amending the Constitution.172  The subject-matter 
restrictions associated with these five amendment procedures 
combined with the multiplicity of initiators show why the Canadian 
Constitution is an example of the restricted multi-track framework. 
The Spanish Constitution also demonstrates the restricted 
multi-track framework.  The government, either house of the 
national legislature, or the legislatures of the country’s autonomous 
communities may initiate a formal amendment proposal.173  The 
default formal amendment rule then requires each house of the 
legislature to approve the proposal by a three-fifths vote.174  
Alternatively, where both houses are unable to approve the 
 
 165. Id. at s. 38, para. 1.  Territorial population does not appear to count 
toward national population.  See id. at s. 38, para. 2. 
 166. Id. at s. 41 
 167. The Canadian Constitution also authorizes provinces to dissent from, 
and thereby avoid being bound by, certain formal amendments, as well as to opt 
out from others.  See id. at s. 38, paras. 2–4, s. 40. 
 168. Id. at s. 41. 
 169. Id. at s. 44. 
 170. Id. at s. 43. 
 171. Id. at s. 42, para. 1(f). 
 172. Id. at s. 41. 
 173. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.], B.O.E. n. 87, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
 174. Id. at B.O.E. n. 167, para. 1. 
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amendment proposal by the required two-thirds threshold, the 
amendment may pass with simple majority approval in the Senate 
and two-thirds approval in the Congress.175  The formal amendment 
process also includes an optional final step: a referendum, if 
requested by one-tenth of the members of either house within fifteen 
days of approval in the national legislature.176  For formal 
amendments to the Crown, the Constitution’s fundamental 
principles and its entrenchment of rights and liberties, the power to 
initiate an amendment similarly rests with the government, either 
house of the national legislature, or the legislatures of the 
autonomous communities.  Ratification requires a different 
procedure: two-thirds approval in each house of the national 
legislature, followed by the new elections for the national legislature 
and two-thirds approval from each of the newly constituted 
chambers, followed by ratification by referendum.177 
5. Exceptional Single-Track Amendment 
TABLE 10: EXCEPTIONAL SINGLE-TRACK FRAMEWORK IN DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTIONS 
Australia Austria Iceland 
 
The exceptional single-track and exceptional multi-track 
frameworks are similar to the restricted single-track and multi-
track frameworks, respectively.  Both exceptional frameworks differ 
from the restricted frameworks only insofar as each of the 
exceptional frameworks entrenches only two amendment 
procedures: one default amendment procedure that applies 
generally to all amendable constitutional provisions, and one special 
amendment procedure that applies exclusively to a single 
constitutional provision or a set of related provisions.  Under both 
exceptional frameworks, the special amendment procedure 
incorporates the first procedure within it.  Amending the specially 
entrenched provision or set of related provisions therefore requires 
the successful completion of one of the available amendment 
procedures for making a formal amendment and an additional 
procedure that is not otherwise required for amending other 
constitutional provisions.  This additional procedure is what is most 
significant about the exceptional frameworks of formal 
amendment—it is reserved exceptionally for only one constitutional 
provision or one set of related provisions. 
 
 175. Id. at B.O.E. n. 167, para. 2. 
 176. Id. at B.O.E. n. 167, para. 3. 
 177. Id. at B.O.E. n. 168. 
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Of the thirty-six constitutions in this study, only three entrench 
the single-track exceptional framework.178  A useful example of this 
exceptional single-track framework is the Icelandic Constitution.179  
The constitutional text provides a general amendment formula,180 
under which amendment proposals must be introduced in the 
unicameral national legislature.  If the legislature adopts the 
proposal, the legislature must then be dissolved for new legislative 
selections.  Once it is newly reconstituted, the legislature must then 
once again adopt the amendment proposal unchanged, and the 
President must subsequently confirm the amendment.181  This 
formal amendment procedure applies to all amendable 
constitutional provisions except the following: “The Evangelical 
Lutheran Church shall be the State Church in Iceland and, as such, 
it shall be supported and protected by the State.”182  Any formal 
amendment to this provision requires an additional step: a national 
referendum.183  This exceptional procedure for amendments related 
to the establishment of the Evangelical Lutheran Church illustrates 
the exceptional dimension of Iceland’s formal amendment 
procedures.  Exclusivity is an important design feature with useful 
applications, as I will show in the pages below.184 
6. Exceptional Multi-Track Amendment 




Only one democratic constitution entrenches the exceptional 
multi-track framework: the U.S. Constitution.  The text establishes 
four ways to amend the Constitution: (1) proposal by two-thirds of 
each house of the national legislature and ratification by three-
quarters of the subnational legislatures; (2) proposal by two-thirds 
of each house of the national legislature and ratification by three-
quarters of subnational conventions; (3) petition by two-thirds of the 
 
 178. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128; BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] 
BGBl No. 1/1920, as last amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl I 
No. 2/1983, arts. 34–35, 44, ¶ 2 (Austria); STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝÐVELDISINS ÍSLANDS, 
art. 79 (Ice.). 
 179. Residents of Iceland have recently voted in a national referendum in 
favor of rewriting their Constitution in light of the 2008 banking crisis.  See 
Robert Robertsson, Voters in Iceland Back New Constitution, More Resource 
Control, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article 
/2012/10/21/iceland-referendum-idUSL5E8LK1TE20121021. 
 180. STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝÐVELDISINS ÍSLANDS, art. 79 (Ice.). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at art. 62. 
 183. Id. at art. 79. 
 184. See infra Subpart III.A. 
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subnational legislatures for a convention to propose one or more 
constitutional amendments, and ratification by three-quarters of the 
subnational legislatures; and (4) petition by two-thirds of the 
subnational legislatures for a convention to propose one or more 
constitutional amendments, and ratification by three-quarters of 
subnational conventions.185  Any of these four formal procedures 
may be used to amend any provision in the U.S. Constitution except 
the Equal State Suffrage Clause, which requires that each state 
hold equal voting power in the Senate.186 
The rule for amending the Equal State Suffrage Clause 
illustrates why the U.S. Constitution exhibits the exceptional multi-
track framework of formal amendment.  In order to amend the 
Equal State Suffrage Clause provision, the Constitution requires 
adherence to one of these four formal procedures in addition to the 
consent of the state or states whose voting power is affected by that 
amendment.187  The additional step of securing state consent is 
required only if political actors also successfully complete one of the 
four formal procedures.188  If they fail in that attempt, securing state 
consent alone will not result in a formal amendment.  Both steps are 
necessary for amending the Equal State Suffrage Clause: 
successfully completing one of the four formal amendment 
procedures and securing state consent.  This higher amendment 
threshold applies exceptionally to the Equal State Suffrage Clause. 
D. The Specifications of Formal Amendment 
Formal amendment rules are therefore anchored in one of two 
foundations and structured around one of six frameworks.  Yet these 
foundations and frameworks are neither self-executing nor do they 
provide the entire blueprint to formal amendment.  They must be 
supplemented by specifications that set into motion their operation.  
These formal specifications are written into the text of the 
constitution and are expressly designed as operational restrictions 
on the formal amendment process that political actors must 
navigate to formally amend the constitution.  Of the several types of 
formal specifications, five of them appear with relative frequency in 
written constitutions: voting thresholds and quorum requirements, 
 
 185. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 186. Id. (“Provided . . . that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
 187. It is theoretically possible that the affected state could express its 
consent along with other states at the three-quarters ratification stage.  This 
would obviate the need for a separate step to obtain the affected state’s consent. 
 188. U.S. CONST. art. V.  The Equal Suffrage Clause may be read as 
requiring the unanimous consent of the states.  See Sanford Levinson, 
Designing an Amendment Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND 
DEMOCRATIC RULE  271, 284 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001). 
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subject-matter restrictions, temporal requirements, electoral 
preconditions, and defense mechanisms. 
1. Voting Thresholds and Quorum Requirements 
All formal amendment rules entrench thresholds specifying the 
quantum of agreement needed to use any of their procedures.  
Constitutional designers have wide latitude to tailor these 
thresholds to the appropriate specifications in their jurisdictions; 
each of the six frameworks of formal amendment therefore 
entrenches various voting thresholds.  We find examples of simple or 
supermajority voting thresholds in the comprehensive single-
track,189 comprehensive multi-track,190 restricted single-track,191 
restricted multi-track,192 exceptional single-track,193 and exceptional 
multi-track frameworks.194  We also find voting thresholds requiring 
at least two of the following in comprehensive, restricted and 
exceptional frameworks: supermajority vote, a combination of 
national and subnational approval, and referendum.195 
Constitutional designers have also specified quorum 
requirements that political actors must meet to validly deploy 
formal amendment rules.  Where political actors do not achieve 
these quorum requirements, the formal amendment rules are 
effectively rendered inoperative.  In Denmark, for example, the 
Constitution requires a referendum to ratify an amendment 
proposal approved by the national legislature.196  In order to validly 
 
 189. See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 46, para. 2 (requiring a referendum); 
Constitution Act, 1986, pt. 3 s 15 (N.Z.) (requiring a majority vote in national 
legislature); GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] § 112 (Nor.) (requiring a supermajority vote in 
the national legislature). 
 190. See SUOMEN PERUSTALSKI, 6 luku 73 (Fin.) (authorizing amendment by a 
combination of simple and supermajority vote, or extraordinary supermajority 
vote); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 192–95 (Switz.) 
(authorizing referendum). 
 191. See INDIA CONST. art. 368 (authorizing amendment by a combination of 
simple majority and supermajority vote). 
 192. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 127–
29 (authorizing amendment by supermajority vote in the national legislature). 
 193. See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128 (requiring simple majority vote in 
the national legislature and in subnational states). 
 194. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring supermajority approval in the 
national legislature and subnational states). 
 195. See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128 (requiring a combination of 
referendum and national/subnational approval under exceptional single-track 
framework); Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, 
s. 38–48 (U.K.) (requiring supermajority and national/subnational approval 
under the restricted multi-track framework); NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [Kenpō], art. 96 
(Japan) (requiring supermajority vote and referendum under a comprehensive 
single-track framework); MAURITIUS CONST., art. 47, para. 3 (requiring 
referendum and extraordinary supermajority in the legislature under a 
restricted single-track framework). 
 196. GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] Lov nr. 88 (Den.). 
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ratify the amendment proposal, at least forty percent of the 
electorate must participate, and of those a simple majority must 
vote in favor.197  Under South Korea’s referendum requirement, a 
simple majority of eligible voters must approve a proposed 
amendment.198  The Canadian Constitution entrenches a variation 
on the conventional quorum requirement: its general amending 
formula requires approval from a simple majority in both houses of 
the national legislature, as well as simple majority approval from at 
least two-thirds of subnational legislatures whose population 
represents at least half of the entire provincial population according 
to the latest census.199  Constitutional designers therefore have 
many options to design quorum requirements.200 
2. Subject-Matter Restrictions 
Democratic constitutions generally entrench two types of 
provisions: the first are susceptible to the formal amendment 
procedures entrenched in the text; the second are absolutely 
immune to them.  These unamendable provisions establish explicit 
restrictions on the subject matter of formal amendments.  Subject-
matter restrictions may preclude formal amendments to 
secularism,201 republicanism,202 or democracy.203  In addition, they 
may prohibit formal amendments that suppress or diminish 
fundamental rights and freedoms,204 create a single-party state,205 
 
 197. Id.  The final step calls for Royal Assent.  Id. 
 198. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] art. 130, para. 2 (S. Kor.). 
 199. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 38, 
para. 1 (U.K.). 
 200. Constitutional designers should be attentive to the choice of electoral 
procedures as these may have an impact on the representativeness of formal 
amendments.  Where a regime authorizes formal amendments by constitutional 
act or fundamental law and the legislature is constituted by a first-past-the-
post system, the legislative majority may in fact represent only a popular 
minority.  This is relevant to the popular legitimacy of formal amendments.  On 
this point, see David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
189, 208–16 (2013). 
 201. See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA,  art. 288, cl. c. 
 202. See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, art. 313, para. 1, cl. b; 
1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.); Art. 139 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA 
REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA, art. 288, cl. b. 
 203.  See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. VII, art. 79, para. 3 
(Ger.); id. at BGBl II, art. 20, para. 1. 
 204. See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, art. 313, para. 2; 
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. VII, art. 79, para. 3 (Ger.); id. at BGBl. I, art. 
1; CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA,  art. 288, cl. d. 
 205. See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, art. 313, para. 1, cl. g; 
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA,  art. 288, cl. i. 
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redraw national borders,206 or violate the separation of powers.207  
Other subject-matter restrictions disallow formal amendments that 
violate federalism208 or international law.209 
Yet subject-matter restrictions often fail to actually protect a 
provision.  First, no degree of constitutional entrenchment can 
withstand revolution.210  Constitutional designers cannot escape this 
risk; all constitutions are vulnerable to this nonconstitutional form 
of change.  Constitutional designers can, however, avoid the faulty 
constitutional design that undermines their effort to entrench a 
subject-matter restriction.  Consider the French Constitution, which 
entrenches a subject-matter restriction on republicanism.211  This 
subject-matter restriction originated in 1884, when Jules Ferry, an 
opponent of monarchy and proponent of republicanism,212 proposed 
to entrench the following provision: “The Republic form of the 
Government cannot be made the subject of a proposed revision.  
Members of families that have reigned in France are ineligible to 
the presidency of the Republic.”213  Today, under the French 
Constitution, “the Republican form of government shall not be the 
object of any amendment.”214 
The design of this subject-matter restriction illustrates the 
second reason why its entrenchment fails to protect it: the text 
absolutely entrenches republicanism, but it does not absolutely 
entrench itself against formal amendment.  Constitutional 
reformers in France could therefore lawfully deploy the 
comprehensive multi-track framework to circumvent the subject-
matter restriction on amendments to republicanism by amending 
the entrenching provision.  This design flaw is fatal to the effort to 
establish a subject-matter restriction.  Rewriting the French 
 
 206. See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, art. 313, para. 1, cl. a; 
1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.). 
 207. See 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] 2, art. 110, para. 1 (1975) (Greece); 
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA,  art. 288, cl. j. 
 208.  See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. VII, art. 79, para. 3 
(Ger.) 
 209. See BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 194, para. 2 
(Switz.) 
 210. JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES 70 (2010).  Relatedly, subject-matter restrictions also fail in the face of 
wholesale constitutional replacement that may be democratic in form though 
not in fact.  See Landau, supra note 200, at 237–41. 
 211. 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.). 
 212. See Nathalie Droin, Retour sur la loi constitutionnelle de 1884: 
contribution à une histoire de la limitation du pouvoir constituent derive, 80 
REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 725, 740 (2009) (Fr.). 
 213.  Law Partially Revising the Constitutional Laws, Aug. 14, 1884, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIC LAWS OF FRANCE 168, 168 (Charles F.A. Currier 
ed. & trans. 1893). 
 214. 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.). 
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Constitution’s entrenching clause in light of this exposed design flaw 
would yield a provision that had been minimally, textually revised 
yet substantively transformed, stating henceforth that “neither this 
clause nor the Republican form of government shall be the object of 
any amendment.”  Constitutional designers may therefore entrench 
both the subject-matter restriction as well as the entrenching 
provision at little additional political cost. 
3. Temporal Limitations 
Formal amendment specifications also limit formal 
amendments with respect to the timing of the various steps 
comprising the amendment process.  We can identify two general 
types of these temporal limitations: deliberation requirements, of 
which there are two kinds (deliberation ceilings and deliberation 
floors)215 and safe harbor provisions.216  Temporal limitations of both 
varieties are commonly entrenched in written constitutions.217 


















 215. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 
195, para. 3; DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] art. 129 (S. Kor.). 
 216. See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, art. 309, para. 1; 
PÕHISEADUS, s 168 (Est.). 
 217. Democratic constitutions commonly entrench deliberation 
requirements.  See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 
LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 129; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA 
DE COSTA RICA, art. 195; Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); CONSTITUTION OF 
LUXEMBOURG, art. 114; DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] arts. 129–30 (S. 
Kor.); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 8, art. 14 (Swed.).  Safe harbors are also 
commonly entrenched.  See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, 
art. 309, para. 1; PÕHISEADUS, s 168 (Est.); 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] 2, art. 110, 
para. 6 (Greece); CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1967, art. 331, cl. c (Uru.). 
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The Costa Rican Constitution provides an instructive example 
of a deliberation ceiling.218  The Constitution requires a special 
commission to render advice on the proposed amendment within no 
more than twenty working days.219  This is the upper limit for the 
commission to deliberate on the matter before the proposal proceeds 
through other steps. 
Conversely, the South Korean Constitution offers an example of 
a deliberation floor.220  A deliberation floor establishes a minimum 
period for deliberating on a proposal prior to a binding vote or action 
on the proposal.221  In order to formally amend the South Korean 
Constitution, the President must make an amendment proposal 
public for at least twenty days: “Proposed amendments to the 
Constitution shall be put before the public by the President for 
twenty days or more.”222  Deliberation floors are the corollary of 
deliberation ceilings.  But rather than establishing an upper time 
limit for deliberating on an amendment proposal, deliberation floors 
require either political actors, the public, or both, to consider an 
amendment proposal for a minimum period of time. 
Formal amendment rules are also sometimes temporally limited 
by a safe harbor.  Whereas deliberation requirements compel 
political actors to consider the merits and demerits of an 
amendment proposal over the course of a defined period of time, safe 
harbors do the opposite: they prohibit political actors from making 
amendment proposals for a defined period of time.  Safe harbors 
might, for example, foreclose political actors from reintroducing a 
defeated amendment proposal until the passage of a defined period.  
The Estonian Constitution adopts this model.223  Alternatively, safe 
harbors might ban amendment proposals for a fixed number of years 
beginning immediately upon the ratification of a new constitution.  
The Cape Verdean Constitution illustrates this safe harbor.224  Safe 
harbors might also prohibit subsequent formal amendments within 
a defined period of time after the successful formal amendment of 
 
 218. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 195, para. 
3. 
 219. Id. 
 220. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] art. 129 (S. Kor.). 
 221. See, e.g., id. (“Proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be put 
before the public by the President for twenty days or more.”). 
 222. Id. 
 223. PÕHISEADUS, s 168 (Est.) (stating that an amendment to the 
Constitution regarding the same issue shall not be initiated within one year 
after the rejection of a corresponding bill by a referendum or by the Riigikogu). 
 224. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, art. 309, para. 1 (creating 
a five-year safe harbor). 
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the constitution.  The Greek and Portuguese Constitutions entrench 
this type of safe harbor.225 
Temporal limitations appear to serve the interest of 
constitutional peace.  Deliberation ceilings give notice to political 
actors that the window for deliberating upon a formal amendment 
will not remain open indefinitely.  They circumscribe amendment 
debates within a finite period of time during which political actors 
are compelled to proceed apace to consider the merits and raise any 
possible demerits about the proposal before time elapses.  Were 
there no time limit within which to act, it would be possible to 
imagine the amendment debate enduring for years—perhaps even 
decades.226  Relatedly, deliberation floors frustrate political actors 
endeavoring to rush the formal amendment process.  By requiring a 
minimum period of deliberation, deliberation floors reserve time to 
consider the amendment proposal.  Safe harbors serve the same 
purpose, though from a different angle.  Entrenching a safe harbor 
to a new constitution allows the document to take root and avoid the 
disruption that formal constitutional amendment entails.  Likewise, 
a safe harbor on reintroducing a failed amendment requires political 
actors to redirect their attention elsewhere, thereby giving both 
themselves and the constitution a respite.  Constitutional designers 
should consider whether and when their own constitutional states 
might benefit from entrenching temporal limitations in the formal 
amendment process.227 
4. Electoral Preconditions 
Constitutions also impose electoral preconditions upon formal 
amendment rules, often requiring successive votes separated by an 
election.  For instance, some prohibit the same voting body from 
both proposing and ratifying formal amendments without an 
intervening national election to reconstitute the body between both 
votes.228  For instance, the Norwegian Constitution requires the 
 
 225. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] 2, art. 110, para. 6 (Greece) (establishing a five-
year safe harbor); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA,  art. 284, para. 1 
(same). 
 226. This is precisely what has transpired in the United States.  The 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment was originally proposed in 1789, but it was not 
ratified until two centuries later in 1992.  See Res. 3, 1st Cong. (1789) 
(proposing amendment); 57 Fed. Reg. 21187 (May 18, 1992) (certifying 
amendment). 
 227. For a comprehensive analysis of the use of temporal limitations in 
constitutional design, see generally Ozan O. Varol, Temporary Constitutions, 
102 CALIF. L REV. 409 (2014) (investigating how constitutional designers do and 
should consider time in designing constitutions). 
 228. See 1994 CONST. art. 195 (Belg.); GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] Lov nr. 88 (Den.); 
1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] 2, art. 110, para. 3 (Greece); STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝÐVELDISINS 
ÍSLANDS, art. 79 (Ice.); Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [GW.] art. 
137 (Neth.).  Some constitutions establish this rule with exceptions.  See, e.g., 
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unicameral national legislature to propose a formal amendment, but 
the proposal can only be approved by a newly elected legislature 
following a general election.229  The South Korean Constitution 
illustrates a variation on this restriction.  It establishes an electoral 
precondition designed to frustrate the entrenchment of a formal 
amendment from which an incumbent president would profit: 
“Amendments to the Constitution for the extension of the term of 
office of the President or for a change allowing for the reelection of 
the President shall not be effective for the President in office at the 
time of the proposal for such amendments to the Constitution.”230 
These electoral preconditions seem intended to prevent self-dealing 
that would either benefit incumbent political actors or disadvantage 
their adversaries. 
5. Defense Mechanisms 
Constitutional designers have also entrenched defense 
mechanisms within formal amendment rules.  Whereas voting 
thresholds, quorum requirements, subject-matter restrictions, 
temporal limitations, and electoral conditions constrain how formal 
amendment rules are used, defense mechanisms disable the formal 
amendment process altogether.  Spurred by fears that the 
amendment process could be hijacked by foreign or nefarious 
influences, rushed in the face of a national emergency, or 
compromised during times of war or instability, these defense 
mechanisms remove the power of formal amendment from political 
actors.  It is not unusual for constitutional designers to disable the 
formal amendment process during a national emergency, martial 
law, or a state of siege or war.231  For example, the Spanish 
Constitution orders that “the process of constitutional amendment 
may not be initiated in time of war or under any of the states 
contemplated in Article 116,”232 which includes “alarm, emergency 
and siege (martial law).”233 The Estonian Constitution declares that 
“amendment of the Constitution shall not be initiated, nor shall the 
Constitution be amended, during a state of emergency or a state of 
war.”234 
Constitutions may also disable the formal amendment process 
during periods of regency or succession.  When the monarch is 
absent or unable to serve, constitutions prohibit formal 
 
PÕHISEADUS, s 165 (Est.); SUOMEN PERUSTALSKI, 6 luku 73 (Fin.); 
REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 8, art. 16 (Swed.). 
 229. See GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] § 112 (Nor.). 
 230. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] art. 128, para. 2 (S. Kor.). 
 231. See 1994 CONST. art. 196 (Belg.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO 
VERDE, art. 315; CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA, art. 289. 
 232. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.], B.O.E. n. 169, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
 233. Id. at B.O.E. n. 116. 
 234. PÕHISEADUS, s 161 (Est.). 
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amendments,235 perhaps out of fear that the regent named as 
steward would seek to advantage himself via constitutional 
amendment during the monarch’s absence.  For instance, in 
Luxembourg, the Constitution declares that “during a regency, no 
change can be made to the Constitution concerning the 
constitutional prerogatives of the Grand Duke, his status as well as 
the order of succession.”236  The Belgian Constitution imposes a 
similar prohibition: “During a regency, no change can be made in 
the Constitution with respect to the constitutional powers of the 
King and Articles 85 to 88, 91 to 95, 106 and 197 of the 
Constitution.”237  Borrowing from these monarchical design 
strategies, constitutional designers could impose analogous 
prohibitions in republican forms of government during periods of 
interim government or when a vacancy exists in a high office (such 
as the presidency).  Constitutional designers could likewise disable 
formal amendment rules within a defined period of time prior to an 
election.  This would help guard against illegitimate, though 
perhaps not illegal, efforts to exploit formal amendment rules to 
shape the result in change-of-control contests. 
III.  DESIGNING FORMAL AMENDMENT RULES 
Formal amendment rules are therefore structured in three tiers.  
At their base, they are anchored in one of two underlying 
foundations.  The first entrenches a distinction between formal 
amendment and constitutional revision.  The second makes no 
distinction between amendment and revision but, as I will show 
below,238 is susceptible to judicially imposed restrictions that mirror 
the distinction between amendment and revision.  The second tier in 
the structure of formal amendment rules is one of six amendment 
frameworks: comprehensive, restricted, or exceptional single track; 
or comprehensive, restricted, or exceptional multi-track. Formal 
amendment rules also consist of supplementary specifications—for 
instance, voting thresholds, quorum requirements, content 
restrictions, temporal requirements, electoral preconditions, and 
defense mechanisms—that may be used in combination to complete 
the structure of formal amendment. 
This three-tiered classification of the foundations, frameworks, 
and specifications of formal amendment rules helps identify and 
understand formal amendment design possibilities, and it is useful 
as a guide for constitutional designers to achieve their objectives.  
Where, for instance, constitutional designers wish to entrench 
 
 235. See 1994 CONST. art. 197 (Belg.); CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 
115. 
 236. CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 115. 
 237. 1994 CONST. art. 197 (Belg.). 
 238. See infra Subpart III.C. 
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special protections for a given constitutional provision or a family of 
related provisions, they may choose to textually entrench subject-
matter restrictions against formal amendment239 and they may 
likewise specially entrench that provision or family of related 
provisions through one of the restricted or exceptional amendment 
frameworks.240  Likewise where, for example, constitutional 
designers wish to keep the formal amendment process 
uncomplicated, transparent, and subject to little misinterpretation, 
they may entrench the comprehensive single-track amendment 
framework.241  In this final Part, I explore and demonstrate how 
constitutional designers may use this new classification to reinforce 
federalism, express constitutional values, enhance or diminish the 
judicial role, and pursue democratic outcomes relating to 
governance, constitutional endurance, and amendment ease or 
difficulty.  I reiterate here what I stated at the outset of this study: 
the purpose of this Article is to re-enliven the study of formal 
amendment rules by demonstrating its possibilities in constitutional 
design. 
A. Federalism Safeguards 
The longest surviving written constitution—the U.S. 
Constitution—entrenches federalism safeguards in its formal 
amendment rules using the exceptional multi-track framework.  The 
Equal Suffrage Clause,242 described above,243 may be formally 
amended only where political actors satisfy one of the Constitution’s 
four amendment procedures and also secure the consent of the state 
whose equal suffrage in the Senate is diminished.244  No other 
provision requires this form of particularized consent.  We know 
from the records of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 that the 
Clause was a necessary bargain between large and small states.245  
Without the protection conferred to small states by the requirement 
that a state consent to any diminution of its voting power in the 
Senate, small states would not have ratified the Constitution.246  As 
 
 239. See supra Subpart II.C.2. 
 240. See supra Subparts II.B.3–6. 
 241. See supra Subpart II.B.1. 
 242. U.S. CONST. art. V (“Provided . . . that no State, without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
 243. See supra Subpart II.A. 
 244. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 245. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 629–31 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911). 
 246. Equal suffrage in the Senate was nonnegotiable for the smaller states. 
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 196, 201 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911). James Madison recollected that the Clause “was probably insisted on 
by the States particularly attached to that equality.”  THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 
296 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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Douglas Smith explains, the Clause was a “constitutional 
essential.”247 
The two exceptional amendment frameworks—single track and 
multi-track—share two properties that distinguish them from other 
frameworks: first, they create two tiers of amendment thresholds; 
and second, the higher threshold applies exclusively to one 
constitutional provision or one set of related constitutional 
provisions, whereas the lower threshold applies to all other 
constitutional provisions.  The higher threshold is cumulative 
insofar as it incorporates the lower threshold within itself.  These 
are two design features of the exceptional amendment frameworks.  
They can also be distinguished on the basis of how the frameworks 
are actually used: constitutional designers have entrenched them 
predominantly to safeguard federalism. 
The federalism-reinforcing function of the exceptional 
frameworks is evident in two other democratic constitutions with 
one of these frameworks, namely the Australian and Austrian 
Constitutions.248  To formally amend the Australian Constitution, 
each house of the bicameral national legislature must adopt a 
proposal by a simple majority.249  Between two and six months 
thereafter, the amendment proposal must be presented to all 
Australian voters in a national referendum.250  If a nationwide 
majority of voters representing majorities in a majority of states 
approve the proposal,251 it proceeds to the final step—assent by the 
Governor-General.252  But the Australian Constitution’s formal 
amendment rules entrench an additional requirement for formal 
amendments that change the balance of powers between the 
national and subnational states.  Where the formal amendment 
affects the powers, boundaries, or representation of a state, the 
amendment must also be ratified by a majority of voters in that 
 
 247. Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles 
of Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 322 (1997). 
 248. Of the four democratic constitutions entrenching the single-track or 
multi-track exceptional framework of formal amendment—Australia, Austria, 
Iceland, and the United States—only Iceland uses the exceptional framework to 
grant special protection to a constitutional provision that is not expressly 
related to federalism.  See STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝÐVELDISINS ÍSLANDS, arts. 62, 79 
(Ice.) (applying the exceptional amendment framework to the established 
church). 
 249. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. The office of Governor-General is partly ceremonial, constitutional, 
mystical, and practical.  For more on the evolution of the office in Australia, see 
generally Greg Craven, The Developing Role of the Governor-General: The 
Goldenness of Silence, 32 FED. L. REV. 281 (2004) (Austl.) (illustrating the many 
functions of the Governor-General). 
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affected state.253  This is similar to the structure of the Equal 
Suffrage Clause in the U.S. Constitution.254 
The exceptional framework also applies in Austria.  The 
Austrian bicameral national legislature consists of the nationally, 
popularly elected National Council, and the Federal Council, whose 
members are chosen proportionately by population by the 
subnational legislatures.255  The Federal Council is therefore where 
subnational interests are more directly represented.  Consistent 
with the exceptional framework, the Austrian Federal 
Constitutional Law establishes a formal amendment threshold for a 
special class of provisions and another for all other provisions.  The 
general amendment rule requires approval by two-thirds 
supermajority vote of a quorum of only one-half in the National 
Council in order to pass a constitutional law or provision.256  But for 
constitutional laws or provisions that restrict the powers and 
prerogatives of subnational states, the Federal Constitutional Law 
also requires a quorum of one-half in the Federal Council and two-
thirds approval in the Federal Council.257  The Federal 
Constitutional Law also protects the design, election rules, and 
eligibility requirements for the Federal Council with a formal 
amendment rule not unlike the Equal Suffrage Clause in Article V 
of the U.S. Constitution.  In order to amend the design, election 
rules, or eligibility requirements for the Federal Council, political 
actors must also secure the consent of a majority of members in the 








 253. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128 (“No alteration diminishing the 
proportionate representation of any State in either House of the Parliament, or 
the minimum number of representatives of a State in the House of 
Representatives, or increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of 
the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the Constitution in 
relation thereto, shall become law unless the majority of the electors voting in 
that State approve the proposed law.”). 
 254. The South African Constitution also protects subnational entities by 
ensuring that if a formal amendment “concerns only a specific province or 
provinces, the National Council of Provinces may not pass the Bill or the 
relevant part unless it has been approved by the legislature or legislatures of 
the province or provinces concerned.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996, sec. 74, para. 8. 
 255. See BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] BGBl No. 1/1920, as last 
amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl I No. 2/1983, arts. 26, 34–35 
(Austria). 
 256. Id. at art. 44, ¶ 1. 
 257. Id. at art. 44, ¶ 2. 
 258. Id. at art. 35, ¶ 4. 
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Constitutional designers must often be particularly attentive to 
the vertical separation of powers between national and subnational 
governments.  They can learn from these examples of the 
exceptional framework of formal amendment inasmuch as Australia, 
Austria, and the United States have been successful to moderately 
successful in their management of federalism.  Although the 
strength of federal relations in these constitutional states has not 
hinged exclusively (nor even primarily) on the design of formal 
amendment rules, the extent to which formal amendment rules give 
voice and representation to subnational states within the larger 
federal structure is a consideration that constitutional designers 
should not discount, particularly at the early stages of constitution 
design where the design of constitutional rules are as important for 
the aspiration or intent they reflect as the binding effect they 
ultimately have.  Granting to subnational states veto power over 
formal amendments that affect the distribution and scope of 
subnational powers serves both as a signal of good faith in 
contentious constitutional design and a useful check on national 
government as federalism evolves under the new constitution. 
B. Constitutional Values 
Constitutional designers commonly express constitutional 
values in the preamble.  For instance, Japan’s postwar Constitution 
expresses its commitment to peace and nonaggression in its 
preamble: “We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and 
are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human 
relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and 
existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving 
peoples of the world.”259  The preamble moreover declares that the 
Constitution is founded in the “universal principle” of popular 
sovereignty: “Government is a sacred trust of the people, the 
 
 259. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], pmbl. (Japan). 
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authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which 
are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits 
of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of 
mankind upon which this Constitution is founded.”260  The current 
Japanese prime minister has recently undertaken controversial 
efforts to amend the Constitution, including the preamble, to reflect 
what he argues are Japan’s modern constitutional values.261 
Constitutional designers also express constitutional values 
elsewhere.  For example, the non-preambular text of the Finnish 
Constitution declares that it will “guarantee the inviolability of 
human dignity and the freedoms and rights of the individual and 
promote justice in society,” and adds, “Finland participates in 
international co-operation for the protection of peace and human 
rights and for the development of society.”262  Similarly, the South 
African Constitution declares outside the preamble that the state is 
founded on the values of human dignity, equality, human rights and 
freedoms, non-racialism, non-sexism, constitutional supremacy, the 
rule of law, universal adult suffrage, voter registration, regular 
elections, accountability, responsiveness, transparence, and multi-
party democratic government.263  Spain also entrenches a statement 
of constitutional values in the non-preambular text of its 
constitution: “Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic 
State, subject to the rule of law, which advocates freedom, justice, 
equality and political pluralism as highest values of its legal 
system.”264 
This new classification of formal amendment rules suggests 
that constitutional designers may express constitutional values in a 
third site: formal amendment rules themselves.265  Constitutional 
designers may deploy special forms of entrenchment in their design 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. See Tobias Harris, Shinzo Abe’s Constitutional Quest, WALL ST. J. (May 
16, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887323582904578486642338035044.html; Yuka Hayashi, 
Japan Leader Charts Path for Military’s Rise, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2013, 6:10 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887323551004578438253084917008.html; Yuka Hayashi, New 
Headwinds for Constitution Campaign, WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 24, 2013, 4:22 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/05/24/new-headwinds-for-
constitution-campaign; Tokujin Matsudaira, New Developments on Japan’s 
Proposed Constitutional Amendment Process, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Apr. 23, 
2013), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/04/new-developments-on-japans-
proposed-constitutional-amendment-process/. 
 262. SUOMEN PERUSTALSKI, 1 luku 1 (Fin.). 
 263. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, sec. 1. 
 264. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.], B.O.E. n. 1, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
 265. I have theorized and illustrated how formal amendment rules may be 
used to express constitutional values.  See generally Albert, supra note 5 
(arguing that constitutional designers may express constitutional values in 
their design of formal amendment rules). 
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of formal amendment rules to identify what matters more or most in 
a constitutional text.  By incorporating special forms of 
entrenchment into their design of certain constitutional provisions, 
constitutional designers can thereby signal their importance.  There 
are obvious and less obvious ways to assign special forms of 
entrenchment and to prioritize constitutional provisions in order to 
express constitutional values.  The more obvious ways include 
assigning heightened protection to a constitutional provision within 
the restricted frameworks of formal amendment, making a 
constitutional provision absolutely unamendable using subject-
matter restrictions, or using both in combination.  The less obvious 
ways include entrenching the distinction between amendment and 
revision, or combining temporal limitations with electoral 
conditions. 
Consider the restricted multi-track framework entrenched in 
the Canadian Constitution.  As the degree of procedural difficulty 
increases from the first to the fifth amendment procedure, the 
importance of the subject matter of the amendment procedures 
likewise increases.  Whereas provincial unilateral amendment may 
amend a provincial constitution,266 and parliamentary amendment 
may be used to amend a constitutional provision dealing exclusively 
with the House of Commons,267 the Canadian Constitution requires 
something more—the consent of Parliament and the affected 
province—to amend provincial boundaries.268  Similarly, the 
Constitution requires a higher threshold—the approval of 
Parliament and a supermajority of provinces—to amend provincial 
representation in the Senate.269  The Constitution reserves the 
highest quantum of agreement—unanimous consent—for changes to 
what its drafters regarded as the most important constitutional 
provisions, namely Canada’s association with the monarchy.270 
What appears to underpin this framework is a hierarchy of 
constitutional importance.  This rigid escalating framework 
channels political actors toward fixed routes for formal amendment.  
These routes range from difficult to even more difficult to nearly 
impossible.  As the degree of procedural difficulty rises under this 
restricted amendment framework, the subject matter of the 
provisions assigned to these increasing amendment thresholds 
likewise rises in importance, at least in Canada.271  Constitutional 
 
 266. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, s. 45 
(U.K.). 
 267. Id. at s. 44. 
 268. Id. at s. 43. 
 269. Id. at s. 42. 
 270. Id. at s. 41. 
 271. See PETER W. HOGG, I CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 85 (5th ed. 2007 
& Supp. 2010); Stephen A. Scott, Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and New 
Constitutional Amendment Processes, 20 U. W. ONT. L. REV. 247, 303–04 (1982); 
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designers may therefore confer special or lesser status on 
constitutional provisions by assigning varying degrees of formal 
amendment difficulty and thereby establishing a constitutional 
hierarchy in their design of formal amendment rules. 
Constitutional designers may alternatively express 
constitutional values by entrenching subject-matter restrictions.  
Notwithstanding the naivety of a constitutional design that relies on 
the force of mere words to protect the constitutional text from 
amendment or replacement,272 subject-matter restrictions 
nonetheless reflect the considered judgment of constitutional 
designers to set apart some provision or provisions of the 
constitution.  Whether this special entrenchment is spurred by a 
political bargain, Ulyssian self-constraint, or the expression of 
constitutional values, the predicate is the same: to designate a 
constitutional provision as special—as the German Basic Law 
does—by absolutely entrenching the concept of human dignity.273  
Constitutional designers may therefore specially entrench, and 
thereby express, constitutional values with subject-matter 
restrictions.  They may also combine one of the restricted 
frameworks with subject-matter restrictions, constructing a 
constitutional hierarchy with escalating thresholds of amendment 
difficulty that culminate with amendment impossibility. 
The distinction between amendment and revision may similarly 
be exploited to express constitutional values.  By differentiating one 
class of provisions subject exclusively to revision from another class 
subject more freely to amendment, constitutional designers may 
designate the former as not only more important, but also more 
fundamental to the constitutional regime than the latter.  For 
instance, the Spanish Constitution establishes different voting 
thresholds and amendment procedures for constitutional changes, 
variously defined as amendments or revisions, with the revisionary 
changes requiring substantially more difficult procedures.274  
Constitutional designers may adopt this distinction, make 
provisions they deem more fundamental subject to revisionary 
change, and thereby signal their relative importance. 
Constitutional designers may also express constitutional values 
using temporal limitations and electoral preconditions.  For 
instance, constitutional designers may impose deliberation 
 
Walter Dellinger, The Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A 
Comparative Perspective, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283, 300 (1982). 
 272. Melissa Schwartzberg, Should Progressive Constitutionalism Embrace 
Popular Constitutionalism?, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295, 1308 n.55 (2011). 
 273. The German Basic Law holds that “human dignity shall be inviolable,” 
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 1, para. 1 (Ger.), and expressly 
designates it as unamendable.  See id. at BGBl. VII, art. 79, para. 3. 
 274. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.], B.O.E. n. 168, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
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requirements for certain constitutional provisions and not others; 
this is a less absolutist strategy than entrenching subject-matter 
restrictions yet it conveys a similar message about the specialness of 
a constitutional provision or a set of provisions.  Constitutional 
designers may also choose to impose safe harbors around a 
constitutional provision or a set of provisions, even though safe 
harbors commonly apply only to entire constitutions.  Finally, 
subjecting a constitutional provision or provisions to electoral 
preconditions—for instance, requiring two successive national 
legislative votes separated by national legislative elections—can 
highlight constitutional importance.  The same is true of combining 
temporal requirements with electoral conditions, such as imposing a 
safe harbor around a provision and requiring two successive 
referenda separated by a reasonable number of years in order to 
amend that provision. 
C. The Judicial Role 
Formal amendment in the United States and India 
demonstrates the difficulty of predicting when democratic courts 
will take an active role in managing the formal amendment 
process.275  Neither written constitution entrenches the distinction 
between amendment and revision, but courts in each country have 
taken different approaches on whether the formal amendment 
process is bound by unwritten norms on amendability.  In the 
United States, the rules of formal amendment do not restrict what 
may be amended using the normal processes of amendment.276  The 
Supreme Court has rejected claims that constitutional amendments 
may be unconstitutional277 but has agreed that the ratification of a 
formal amendment must be reasonably contemporaneous with its 
proposal in order to be constitutional.278  The Court has, however, 
disclaimed responsibility for determining contemporaneousness, 
ceding this duty to Congress under the political question doctrine.279 
Yet in India the nonentrenchment of the distinction between 
amendment and revision has not precluded its emergence.  The 
 
 275. Judicial review of constitutional amendments may be procedural or 
substantive.  For a leading analysis on this distinction as well as the difficulty 
of identifying the line separating procedure from substance, see generally 
KEMAL GÖZLER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (2008) (inquiring into the practice and theory of judicial 
review of formal amendments around the world). 
 276. See U.S. CONST. art. V.  But the slave-traded and census-based taxation 
were made unamendable until the year 1808.  See id.  Likewise, the composition 
of the Senate is made subject to a special consent requirement.  See id. 
 277. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (upholding Nineteenth 
Amendment); Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (upholding 
Eighteenth Amendment). 
 278. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921). 
 279. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939). 
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Indian Supreme Court has developed the distinction by limiting the 
national legislature’s power to amend the Constitution, even though 
the constitutional text imposes no such substantive limits on the 
formal amendment power.280  In creating what is known as the basic 
structure doctrine, the Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he true 
position is that every provision of the Constitution can be amended 
provided in the result the basic foundation and structure of the 
Constitution remains the same.”281  Neither constitutional 
supremacy, republicanism, democracy, secularism, the separation of 
powers, nor federalism can be “destroyed” by an amendment, 
insisted the Court, suggesting that those foundational features of 
Indian constitutionalism can be changed only with a new 
constitution.282  Constitutional designers should therefore not 
presume that the non-entrenchment of the distinction will 
necessarily lead to either its rejection, as in the United States, or its 
judicial creation, as in India. 
But there are ways to exclude the judiciary from matters 
involving formal amendment.  Constitutional designers intent on 
diminishing the judicial role may learn from the Netherlands, where 
formal amendment occurs through the legislative process with the 
proposal and ratification of a law deemed constitutional.283  Unlike 
constitutional states where courts are granted by delegation or 
acquiescence the power of judicial review and would therefore 
possess the power to review the constitutionality of such laws, the 
Netherlands forecloses this power from Dutch courts.  The Dutch 
Constitution prohibits courts from exercising the power of judicial 
review: “The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties 
shall not be reviewed by the courts.”284  Dutch courts have 
interpreted this provision broadly to prohibit them from reviewing 
the constitutionality of laws against both written laws and 
unwritten principles of natural law.285 
Constitutional designers intent on enhancing the judicial role 
may purposely introduce ambiguity in their design of formal 
amendment rules.286  The two restricted amendment frameworks 
 
 280. See INDIA CONST. art. 368. 
 281. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225, 366 
(India). 
 282. Id. 
 283. See Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [GW.] art. 137–42 
(Neth.). 
 284. Id. at art. 120. 
 285. Gerhard van der Schyff, Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the 
Netherlands: A Bridge Too Far?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 275, 277–78  (2010). 
 286. This applies in primarily common-law regimes where the judiciary 
either asserts or is granted the authority of constitutional control.  But courts 
are not always endowed with, nor do they always assert, this power; it may 
belong to other bodies, for instance legislatures or the constitution-making 
body. 
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appear from experience to be the most vulnerable to interpretive 
ambiguity.  By design, the restricted amendment frameworks create 
more than one formal amendment procedure, and each is deployable 
only for specifically enumerated constitutional provisions of the 
constitution.  Constitutional designers can exploit this restricted 
framework by defining only in broad terms which constitutional 
provisions are formally amendable by specific amendment 
procedures, thereby leaving future political actors to resolve which 
amendment procedure they must follow to formally amend specific 
constitutional provisions.  Though it was unlikely designed with this 
intention in mind, the Canadian Constitution’s restricted multi-
track framework has created confusion about which of its five formal 
amendment procedures applies to formally amending the long-
standing practice of prime ministerial Senate appointments.287  This 
is a matter of current constitutional controversy; the Government of 
Canada recently requested an advisory opinion from the Supreme 
Court to clarify these and related questions.288 
D. Democratic Outcomes 
Constitutional designers may also use this classification to 
measure how the choice of formal amendment rules maps onto 
democratic outcomes in constitutional states.  The relationship 
between formal amendment design and democratic governance, 
constitutional endurance, and amendment difficulty is of particular 
interest to constitutional designers insofar as their design of formal 
amendment rules is informed both by the suitability of a particular 
foundation, framework, or specification for their own constitutional 
 
 287. Part of the debate concerns which part of the formal amendment rules 
will be engaged by the proposed changes to Senatorial appointments.  Under 
the Constitution’s formal amendment rules, amendments to “the method of 
selecting Senators” must pass the default amendment threshold, requiring 
approval from both houses of the national legislature and from two-thirds of the 
subnational legislatures whose aggregate population represents at least half of 
the population of all provinces combined.  See Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, s. 42 (U.K.).  However, the Constitution’s 
formal amendment rules also state that “subject to sections 41 and 42, 
Parliament may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in 
relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of 
Commons.”  See id. at s. 44.  The changes proposed are tracked historically and 
available on the Canada of Parliament’s website. LEGISinfo, PARLIAMENT CAN.,  
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&billId=
5093616&View=3 (last visited Apr. 25, 2014). 
 288. The questions referred to the Supreme Court of Canada are archived by 
the Privy Council Office.  See PC Number: 2013-0070, PRIVY COUNCIL OFF. (Feb. 




layFlg=1.  The Court’s advisory opinion was released on April 25, 2014.  See 
Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.R. 32 (Can.). 
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regime, and also by demonstrable correlative or causational 
evidence that liberal democracies are more likely to adopt a 
particular framework or combination of formal amendment rules. 
Among the thirty-six highest-performing constitutional 
democracies, the most-to-least common amendment frameworks are 
comprehensive multi-track (13), comprehensive single track (10), 
restricted single track (5), restricted multi-track (4), exceptional 
single track (3) and exceptional multi-track (1). 
TABLE 14: MOST-TO-LEAST COMMON AMENDMENT FRAMEWORKS IN 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS 
(WITH DEMOCRACY INDEX RANKING) 
Comprehensive Multi-Track 
Amendment Framework 





















Cape Verde (26) 
Denmark (4) 
Ireland (13) 
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Exceptional Multi-Track 
Amendment Framework 
United States (21) 
 
Using the Democracy Index and this distribution of amendment 
frameworks, we can draw three additional conclusions.  First, the 
two comprehensive amendment frameworks account for twenty-
three of the thirty-six amendment frameworks in the world’s top 
constitutional democracies.289  Second, three of the top five 
constitutional democracies entrench the comprehensive single-track 
framework.290  Third, the United States is alone among democracies 
in entrenching the exceptional multi-track framework, thus further 
confirming the exceptionalism that scholars have attributed to the 
U.S. Constitution.291 
The Democracy Index arrives at its overall ranking by 
measuring subsidiary indicators of democracy, including electoral 
procedures and pluralism, the functioning of government, and 
 
 289. Thirteen constitutions entrench the comprehensive multi-track 
framework.  See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, arts. 
195–96; SUOMEN PERUSTALSKI, 6 luku 73 (Fin.); 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.); 1975 
SYNTAGMA [SYN.] 2, art. 110 (Greece); Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); 
CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 114; Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden [GW.] arts. 137–42 (Neth.); USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE, arts. 
168–71 (Slovn.); DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] art. 98 (S. Kor.); 
REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 8, arts. 14–16 (Swed.); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 
18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 192–95 (Switz.); MINGUO XIANFA  art. 174 (1947) 
(Taiwan); CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1967, art. 331 (Uru.).  Ten constitutions entrench 
the comprehensive single-track framework.  See 1994 CONST. art. 195 (Belg.); 
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO VERDE, arts. 309–12, 314; Ústavní zákon č. 
1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic], art. 9, 
para. 4; GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] Lov nr. 88 (Den.); GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, 
BGBl. VII, art. 79 (Ger.); IR. CONST., 1937, art. 46; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], 
art. 96 (Japan); Constitution Act, 1986, pt. 3 s 15 (N.Z.); GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] § 
112 (Nor.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA,  arts. 285–86. 
 290. See GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] Lov nr. 88 (Den.) (fourth); Constitution Act, 
1986, pt. 3 s 15 (N.Z.) (fifth); GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] § 112 (Nor.) (first). 
 291. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 122–23 (2006); SEYMOUR MARTIN 
LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 20–23 (1996); 
Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in 
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 85–86 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); 
G. Brinton Lucas, Structural Exceptionalism and Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 1965, 1998 (2010); Miguel Schor, Judicial Review and 
American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 535, 536–38 
(2008); Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 
OR. L. REV. 97, 97–99 (2002). 
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political participation.292  Eight of the thirty-six countries earn 
perfect scores for electoral procedures and pluralism; of these, six 
entrench one of the two comprehensive amendment frameworks.293  
Of the bottom eight scores for electoral procedures and pluralism, 
four are held by countries entrenching the restricted single-track 
framework.294  Six of the top twelve scores for functioning of 
government belong to countries entrenching the comprehensive 
multi-track framework.295  Moreover, six of the nine restricted 
frameworks rank in the bottom ten for political participation,296 and 
the other three rank seventh, twelfth and twentieth, respectively.297  
These are noteworthy, but more country-specific research is needed 
to determine whether, and if so why, these relationships are more 
than correlative. 
Constitutional designers may likewise have an interest in 
whether one of the frameworks is associated with constitutional 
mortality or endurance.298  The recent work of Zachary Elkins, Tom 
Ginsburg, and James Melton suggests that the rate of formal 
amendment, and by implication the formal amendment procedures 
themselves, bears some measurable relationship to the life 
 
 292. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 16. 
 293. See GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] Lov nr. 88 (Den.); SUOMEN PERUSTALSKI, 6 luku 
73 (Fin.); CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 114; Constitution Act, 1986, pt. 3 
s 15 (N.Z.); GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] § 112 (Nor.); CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1967, art. 331 
(Uru.). 
 294. See CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA § 89; KOSTITUZZJONI TA’ MALTA, art. 66; 
MAURITIUS CONST., art. 47; S. AFR. CONST., 1996, sec. 74. 
 295. See SUOMEN PERUSTALSKI, 6 luku 73 (Fin.); CONSTITUTION OF 
LUXEMBOURG, art. 114; Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [GW.] 
arts. 137–42 (Neth.); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 8, arts. 14–16 (Swed.); 
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 192–95 (Switz.); 
CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1967, art. 331 (Uru.). 
 296. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 127–
29; PÕHISEADUS, ss 161–68 (Est.); INDIA CONST. art. 368; KOSTITUZZJONI TA’ 
MALTA, art. 66; MAURITIUS CONST., art. 47; CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.], 
B.O.E. n. 166–68, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
 297.  See CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA § 89 (twentieth); Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, s. 38–48 (U.K.) (seventh); S. 
AFR. CONST., 1996, sec. 74 (twelfth). 
 298. Constitutional endurance is not a democratic outcome in the sense that 
all long-enduring constitutions are democratic or that all democratic 
constitutions are long enduring.  For example, constitutional endurance may be 
the result of an authoritarian regime’s resistance to constitutional change.  
However, in a functioning constitution in a liberal democracy, constitutional 
endurance is likely to reflect respect for civil liberties, democratic political 
culture, few barriers to political participation, fair electoral procedures, and 
properly functioning government.  It is of course also possible for constitutional 
revision—which leads to constitutional mortality for the superseded 
constitution—to occur in regimes where these five democratic indicators are 
high. 
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expectancy of a constitution.299  They conclude that constitutional 
endurance is generally associated with low amendment thresholds, 
though they stress that it is not always clear which type of 
amendment threshold is easier than another: “For example, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether a constitution that requires a two-
thirds vote of the legislature to amend the constitution is more or 
less flexible than one that requires an ordinary legislative majority 
with a subsequent referendum by the public.”300  Future research 
could build on their work by exploring whether states with high 
constitutional mortality rates have ultimately found constitutional 
stability by switching from one framework to another, or by 
adopting particular specifications. 
We can draw three observations from currently-in-force 
constitutions.  First, three of the five oldest constitutions entrench 
one of the two exceptional frameworks: Australia (single-track), 
Austria (single-track) and the United States (multi-track).301 
Second, in the twenty years immediately following the Second World 
War, eight then-new and still-in-force constitutions entrenched a 
comprehensive amendment framework: five entrenched the multi-
track framework302 and three entrenched the single-track 
framework.303  Three also entrenched the restricted single-track 
framework.304  Third, in the aftermath of the Cold War, six out of 
the nine still-in-force constitutions have entrenched one of the two 
comprehensive amendment frameworks: three single-track and305 
three multi-track,306 along with one each under the restricted single-
 
 299. ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
99–100 (2009). 
 300. Id. at 100. 
 301. See U.S. CONST. art. V; AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128; BUNDES-
VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] BGBl No. 1/1920, as last amended by 
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl I No. 2/1983, arts. 34-35, 44 (Austria);. 
The 1868 Luxembourgian Constitution and the 1814 Norwegian Constitution 
entrench the comprehensive multi-track and single-track framework, 
respectively.  See CONSTITUTION OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 114; GRUNNLOVEN [GRL.] § 
112 (Nor.). 
 302. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, arts. 195–
96; 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.); Costituzione [Cost.] (It.); DAEHANMINKUK 
HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] art. 98 (S. Kor.); MINGUO XIANFA  art. 174 (1947) (Taiwan). 
 303. See GRUNDLOVEN [GRL] Lov nr. 88 (Den.); GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, 
BGBl. VII, art. 79 (Ger.); NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], art. 96 (Japan). 
 304. See INDIA CONST. art. 368; KOSTITUZZJONI TA’ MALTA, art. 66; MAURITIUS 
CONST., art. 47. 
 305. See 1994 CONST. art. 195 (Belg.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA DE CABO 
VERDE, arts. 309–12, 314; Ústavní zákon č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České Republiky 
[Constitution of the Czech Republic], art. 9, para. 4. 
 306. See SUOMEN PERUSTALSKI, 6 luku 73 (Fin.); USTAVA REPUBLIKE 
SLOVENIJE, arts. 168–71 (Slovn.); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 
101, arts. 192–95 (Switz.). 
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track,307 restricted multi-track,308 and exceptional single-track 
frameworks.309 
It may also interest constitutional designers to evaluate the 
relationship between constitutional endurance and the 
entrenchment of temporal limitations like deliberation requirements 
or safe harbors.310  One could reasonably hypothesize that 
deliberation ceilings and safe harbors both foster constitutional 
endurance.  Insofar as deliberation ceilings confine constitutional 
amendment debates to a predetermined amount of time, the 
hypothesis would be that the constitution avoids being seen as a 
catalyst or obstruction to the adoption or rejection of a particular 
amendment.  And insofar as safe harbors prohibit constitutional 
amendment or revision within a given period of time after the 
coming-into-force of a new constitution or constitutional provision, 
the related hypothesis would be that safe harbors give the 
constitution a chance to survive through its first years in force—
perhaps the most important years for achieving popular legitimacy.  
Further empirical research on these questions could help illuminate 
whether deliberation ceilings and safe harbors actually do serve the 
interest of constitutional endurance. 
As constitutional designers structure their rules of formal 
amendment, they may likewise wish to inquire whether any of the 
formal amendment frameworks is associated with unusual ease or 
difficulty of formal amendment.  The choice of which framework to 
adopt will turn on whether constitutional designers wish to privilege 
flexibility or stability, or more likely some measure of both.  Donald 
Lutz has computed and compiled data on the difficulty of formal 
amendment in thirty-two constitutional states.311  Lutz’s valuable 
data ranks the easiest and hardest formal amendment processes 
among the pool of studied constitutions.  His data on amendment 
difficulty are not presented in terms of formal amendment 
frameworks.  One could therefore build on Lutz’s important study of 
amendment difficulty by further investigating how the data map 










 307. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, sec. 74. 
 308. See PÕHISEADUS, ss 161–68 (Est.). 
 309. See STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝÐVELDISINS ÍSLANDS, art. 62, 79 (Ice.). 
 310. See supra Subpart II.C.3. 
 311. LUTZ, supra note 61. 
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TABLE 15: AMENDMENT DIFFICULTY AND AMENDMENT FRAMEWORKS 
(WITH LUTZ INDEX OF DIFFICULTY) 
Lutz Ranking of Amendment 
Difficulty 
(In Descending Order)312 
Constitutional Amendment 
Framework 
United States (5.10) Exceptional Multi-Track 
Australia (4.65) Exceptional Single-Track 
Costa Rica (4.10) Comprehensive Multi-Track 
Spain (3.60) Restricted Multi-Track 
Italy (3.40) Comprehensive Multi-Track 
Norway (3.35) Comprehensive Single-Track 
Japan (3.10) Comprehensive Single-Track 
Chile (3.05) Restricted Multi-Track 
Ireland (3.00) Comprehensive Single-Track 
Belgium (2.85) Comprehensive Single-Track 
Denmark (2.75) Comprehensive Single-Track 
Iceland (2.75) Exceptional Single-Track 
France (2.50) Comprehensive Multi-Track 
Finland (2.30) Comprehensive Multi-Track 
India (1.81) Restricted Single-Track 
Greece (1.80) Comprehensive Multi-Track 
Luxembourg (1.80) Comprehensive Multi-Track 
Germany (1.60) Comprehensive Single-Track 
Sweden (1.40) Comprehensive Multi-Track 
Botswana (1.30) Restricted Single-Track 
Austria (0.80) Exceptional Single-Track 
Portugal (0.80) Comprehensive Single-Track 
New Zealand (0.50) Comprehensive Single-Track 
 
Using Lutz’s data, we can begin to make some preliminary 
observations.  The most-difficult-to-amend constitutions that appear 
in both Lutz’s study and mine are, in descending order of difficulty, 
the constitutions of the United States, Australia, Costa Rica, Spain, 
 
 312. This ranking is drawn from Donald Lutz’s study of amendment 
difficulty. See LUTZ, supra note 61. Lutz’s data covers a limited time period; he 
includes no constitution drafted after 1976 in his list of thirty-two constitutions.  
Id.  Some of the constitutions in my study were adopted after 1976.  In this 
Article, my references to the easiest or most difficult formal amendment 
processes identified in Lutz’s study include only those constitutions that were 
then and remain today in force. Lutz’s study of thirty-two democratic 
constitutions does not include the following democratic constitutions in my list 
of thirty-six: Canada, Cape Verde, Czech Republic, Estonia, Malta, Mauritius, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Uruguay.  
My study of thirty-six democratic constitutions does not include the following 
democratic constitutions in Lutz’s study of thirty-two constitutions: Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela, and 
Western Samoa. 
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Italy, Norway, Japan, Chile, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, 
France, Finland, India, Greece, Luxembourg, Germany, Sweden, 
Botswana, Austria, Portugal, and New Zealand.313  Of these twenty-
three shared data points, the two most-difficult-to-amend 
constitutions entrench one of the two exceptional amendment 
frameworks (United States, Australia); two of the three next-most-
difficult-to-amend constitutions entrench the comprehensive multi-
track framework (Costa Rica, Italy); and the two least-difficult-to-
amend constitutions entrench the comprehensive single-track 
amendment framework (New Zealand, Portugal).314 
Among the top fifteen most-difficult-to-amend democratic 
constitutions, five entrench the comprehensive single-track 
framework (Norway, Japan, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark), four 
entrench the comprehensive multi-track framework (Costa Rica, 
Italy, France, Finland), one entrenches the restricted single-track 
framework (India), two entrench the restricted multi-track 
framework (Spain, Chile), two entrench the exceptional single-track 
framework (Australia, Iceland), and one entrenches the exceptional 
multi-track framework (United States).315  Of the ten easiest-to-
amend democratic constitutions, three entrench the comprehensive 
single-track framework (New Zealand, Portugal, Germany), four 
entrench the comprehensive multi-track framework (Sweden, 
Luxembourg, Greece, Finland), two entrench the restricted single-
track framework (Botswana, India), and one entrenches the 
exceptional single-track framework (Austria).316  Further country-
specific study could illuminate why exceptional amendment 
frameworks are associated with a higher index of amendment 
difficulty and correspondingly whether and why comprehensive 
amendment frameworks are associated with a lower index. 
CONCLUSION 
An unamendable constitution is not an option for democratic 
constitutional design.  It would lack the legitimacy of popular 
consent,317 it would betray the self-assurance constitutional 
designers have in themselves and the distrust they bare for 
 
 313. Id.  I have excluded from this list the Swiss and Venezuelan 
Constitutions, which respectively entrenched the second- and third-most 
difficult formal amendment procedures, because the Swiss and Venezuelan 
Constitutions that formed the basis of Lutz’s study have since been replaced by 
new constitutions. 
 314. See supra Subpart II.B. 
 315. See id. 
 316. See id. 
 317. Dellinger, supra note 6, at 386–87.  I have elsewhere suggested that un-
amendability is undemocratic.  See Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 667 (2010). 
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others,318 and its rigidity would risk provoking revolution.319  Yet 
hyper flexibility is as inadvisable as hyper rigidity because it erodes 
the distinction between a constitution and a statute.  Constitutional 
designers must therefore design impermanent yet stable 
constitutions and entrench rules for their amendment.  Karl 
Loewenstein has observed that designers have appropriately sought 
to strike the right balance between stability and flexibility: “[T]he 
process of constitutional amendment everywhere is kept sensibly 
elastic, neither too rigid to invite, with changing conditions, 
revolutionary rupture, nor too flexible to allow basic modifications 
without the consent of qualified majorities.”320 
Although constitutional scholars have emphasized the 
importance of formal amendment rules,321 they have offered 
constitutional designers little guidance on how to actually design 
them.  In this Article, I have endeavored to illustrate and explain 
the structure of formal amendment rules in a way that is useful 
both to constitutional designers tasked with creating them and to 
constitutional scholars engaged in their study.  I have created a new 
classification of formal amendment rules in democratic 
constitutional states.  I have demonstrated that formal amendment 
rules are structured in three tiers, and around options within each 
of these tiers: one of two fundamental foundations, one of six 
operational frameworks, and a combination of supplementary 
specifications.  I have also shown how constitutional designers may 
use this new classification to manage federalism, express 
constitutional values, enhance or diminish the judicial role, and 
pursue democratic outcomes related to governance, constitutional 
endurance, and amendment difficulty. 
My corollary purpose has been to re-enliven the study of formal 
amendment rules.  There are many empirical, historical, and 
normative questions to explore in the comparative study of formal 
amendment: whether democratic outcomes are more likely to follow 
from the entrenchment of any of the foundations, frameworks, or 
specifications of formal amendment rules; whether any of the 
foundations, frameworks, or specifications are associated with 
constitutional mortality or endurance; and whether the ease or 
difficulty of amendment is influenced by the choice of amendment 
 
 318. See Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 
13 CONST. COMMENT. 107, 112–13 (1996). 
 319. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 66 (Liberty Fund 8th ed. 1982) (1915). 
 320. Karl Loewenstein, Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our 
Revolutionary Age, in CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE 
WORLD WAR II 191, 215 (Arnold J. Zurcher ed., 2d ed. 1951). 
 321. I have argued elsewhere that formal amendment rules are so important 
to constitutionalism that they should be subject to a higher threshold of 
amendment than other constitutional provisions. See Richard Albert, Amending 
Constitutional Amendment Rules, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2015). 
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foundation, framework, or specification.  My larger purpose has 
been to contribute to the understanding and evaluation of formal 
amendment rules and to suggest that constitutional designers would 
benefit from the revived study of formal amendment rules as a 
helpful complement to the continuing study of informal amendment. 
